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ABSTRACT 
 The focus of this thesis is to develop an understanding of where civil resistances 
are likely to occur as opposed to violent insurgencies. This work explores the relationship 
between the ethnic power structures within a state and the propensity for civil resistance. 
It further conducts a game theoretic analysis of the choice between violence and 
non-violence by a civil resistance, compared to a state’s choice of repression or 
counterinsurgency. Finally, this thesis examines a series of three case studies of violent 
insurgencies that have transitioned to non-violent civil resistance to identify 
commonalities in the circumstances that led to an insurgency changing its strategy. This 
research provides a new approach for the study of civil resistance by analyzing a 
resistance’s choice as a strategic decision based on environmental and ethnic structures. 
The work furthers research into why resistance leaders choose specific strategies, and 
under what circumstances states may influence the strategic decisions of a resistance. 
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The practicality of insurgent warfare has come under scrutiny over the past 15 years 
due to a rise in popular scholarly research suggesting lower success rates as opposed to 
civil resistance. This research is giving rise to an increased emphasis on civil resistance as 
a viable alternative to insurgent warfare. Major Timothy Ball suggests in his thesis, “From 
Successful Defense to Problematic Offense: The Devolution of Unconventional Warfare,” 
that unconventional warfare operations have historically provided a poor record of success, 
and likewise defensive unconventional warfare is only slightly more justified under 
specific conditions.1 He suggests that the current format of unconventional warfare, 
specifically that of insurgent style warfare, is not particularly efficient in achieving desired 
political goals. Chenoweth and Stephens demonstrate in their work, Why Civil Resistance 
Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict, that out of 323 campaigns from 1900–
2006, civil resistance campaigns achieved a success rate of 53 percent compared to 26 
percent for violent insurgent campaigns.2  Statistically, there appears to be ample evidence 
to suggest that violent insurgencies may be less effective than other potential options in 
achieving the goals of the resisting population, and this trend might be increasing. This 
thesis will expand upon the preceding research and analyze under what conditions a violent 
insurgency or civil resistance will occur. 
Mobilizing a population to engage in armed aggression against a superior enemy is 
difficult. Thoreau describes in his work Civil Disobedience that a population “hesitate [s], 
and they regret, and sometimes they petition; but they do nothing in earnest and with 
effect.”3  Conducting an insurgent-focused unconventional warfare campaign is just as 
difficult when attempting to mobilize a population for a specific cause. Kinetically focused 
                                                 
1 Timothy S. Ball, “From Successful Defense to Problematic Offense: The Devolution of 
Unconventional Warfare” (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), v. 
2 Maria Stephan J. and Chenoweth, Erica, “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of 
Nonviolent Conflict,” International Security 33, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 24. 
3 Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience (London: The Simple Life Press, 1903), 14. 
2 
unconventional warfare (UW) limits a potential populations mobilization for resistance, 
since humans demonstrate a lower capacity for aggression than anticipated and a tendency 
to stop short of violence without significant conditioning.4  In this psycho-sociological 
framework, waging unconventional warfare in the current operating environments may be 
impractical due to an inability to rally enough support to develop significant forces to oust 
a government or occupying hostile. 
This study asks, if civil resistance is systematically more advantageous than 
insurgent warfare, under what situations might a civil resistance develop?  Secondly, what 
are the potential options of the resistance element and the occupying state when initiating 
a resistance movement?  Finally, are there any commonalities in resistances that start with 
a violent insurgency and transition to a nonviolent resistance?  This analysis will provide 
insights into each of these questions. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research is divided into three sections that question the viability of civil 
resistance as a strategic option and the circumstances under which civil resistances are 
more probable to manifest over a violent insurgency. I will argue that by answering these 
questions, it will provide insight into the circumstances and environments that increase or 
decrease a population’s tendency to engage in a civil resistance. It will also demonstrate 
some natural challenges to the development of a civil resistance campaign. This thesis is 
divided into three main questions and will use a quantitative analysis of ethnic power 
relations to demonstrate a propensity toward civil resistance, analyze a theoretic game 
model of the strategic choices of the state and population, and conclude with a qualitative 
analysis of three separate case studies of resistances that transitioned from a violent 
insurgency to a civil resistance. The three questions this thesis asks are: 
 
                                                 
4 Erica Chenoweth, Adria Lawrence, and Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, eds., 
Rethinking Violence: States and Non-State Actors in Conflict, Belfer Center Studies in International 
Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), 151. 
3 
a. Is there a structure of ethnic power sharing division that promotes civil 
resistance over insurgent warfare? 
b. When analyzing a game between a resistance and the state, what are the most 
likely strategic options for each player when choosing between violent 
(insurgency or targeting civilians) and nonviolent options (civil resistance or 
counter-insurgency)? 
c. Using case studies on violent insurgencies that have transitioned from 
insurgency to civil resistance, can we identify particular elements that 
contributed to the outcome of the campaign? 
C. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITIONS 
The rise of scholarly research into civil resistance has led to the use of multiple 
resistance terms that are being used as synonyms, obfuscating the context of the 
phenomenon. Civil resistance has become a vogue topic over the last twenty years and 
there continues to be a variety of terms, developed or adjusted, to identify similar axioms. 
In order to discuss civil resistance, there must first be a commonly understood lexicon. 
Some of the definitions listed in this section are currently listed within military and joint 
service component doctrine. Other civil resistance terms are adopted by the leading 
scholars in civil resistance. This section will adopt and adapt the terminology as appropriate 
to decrease confusion on the lexicon of civil resistance. 
Gene Sharp posits a confusion between the core terms of “nonviolent resistance,” 
“civil resistance,” and “people power.”5  In military usage, resistance is defined in Joint 
Publication 3-05, Special Operations, and explained further in Joint Publication 3-05.1, 
Unconventional Warfare. These military documents define a “resistance movement” as “an 
organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally 
established government or occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability.”6  The 
                                                 
5 Gene Sharp and Joshua Paulson, Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st 
Century Potential (Boston: Extending Horizons Books, 2005), 20. 
6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JP 1-02 
(Washington D.C., 2016), 104. 
4 
resistance movement may either be violent or nonviolent, as long as its goal is to “coerce, 
disrupt, or overthrow a hostile government.”7  The joint publication does not provide a 
clear definition of the distinction between a resistance and an insurgency, but it is 
successful in identifying that there are different forms of resistance, without articulating 
what these all may entail. For this study we will expand the definition derived from JP 3-05 
to afford a greater context in what may be considered a resistance and differentiate between 
various resistance terminology. Terms such as civil defense and civil disobedience, not 
listed in JP 3-05 or JP 3-05.1, are necessary to define the range of options for the resistance 
practitioner.  
Resistance:  A struggle for independence derived from a desire of individuals and 
groups to address grievances of an unpopular regime or occupying power.8 
 
Civil Resistance:  The sustained use of asymmetric actions or activities by civilians 
against a state or occupying power by a population; it involves a collection of 
activities that are nonviolent and avoids imposing physical harm, where practical, 
against the population or occupying power.9 
 
Nonviolent Resistance: Civilian-based methods used to wage conflict through 
social, psychological, economic, and political means without the threat or use of 
violence.10 
 
Pacifism: The principled rejection of the use of physical violence in personal and 
political life.11 
 
                                                 
7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unconventional Warfare, JP 3-05.1 (Washington D.C., 2015), I–7. 
8 Erica Chenoweth and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, “Understanding Nonviolent Resistance: An 
Introduction,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 3 (May 2013): 273, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313480381. 
9 Kurt Schock, “The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 3 
(May 2013): 277, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313476530; Maia Hallward, Juan Masullo, and Cécile 
Mouly, “Civil Resistance in Armed Conflict: Leveraging Nonviolent Action to Navigate War, Oppose 
Violence and Confront Oppression,” Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 12, no. 3 (September 2, 
2017): 1, https://doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2017.1376431. 
10 Chenoweth and Cunningham, “Understanding Nonviolent Resistance,” 273. 
11 Dustin Ells Howes, “The Failure of Pacifism and the Success of Nonviolence,” Perspectives on 
Politics 11, no. 02 (June 2013): 427, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592713001059. 
5 
Civil Disobedience:  Acts by a population that are an intentional violation of the 
law, where the individual or group performing the act is generally known and the 
individual or group is willing to accept punishment fixed by the law.12 
The word insurgency in Joint Publication 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare, further 
defined in Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms, is derived from JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and describes the concept 
of this activity as a defensive option. Like civil resistance, terminology on insurgent 
strategy also encounters difficulty in the defining of activities. In the same context that 
Gene Sharp identified challenges within the lexicon of civil resistance, Walter Laqueur 
laments the imprecision use of words like “irregular warfare,” “guerrilla warfare,” and 
“insurgency,” as demonstrated in military joint doctrine.13  The best compromise for 
defining insurgency is located in Seth Jones’ Waging Insurgent Warfare, when merged 
with JP 3-05.1 and Will Irwin’s definition in Support to Resistance: Strategic Purpose and 
Effectiveness. This study uses unconventional warfare and guerrilla warfare as defined in 
JP 1-02, as they best describe the respective activities as it relates to Laqueur’s concept. 
 
Insurgency: A population’s use of submersion and violence, with the purpose of 
redressing grievances caused by a state or occupying power, with the overall goal 
of seizing, nullifying, or challenging the political control of a state or regional 
area.14 
 
Unconventional warfare (UW): Activities to enable a resistance movement or 
insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by 
operating with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area.15 
 
Guerrilla warfare: Combat operations conducted in enemy-held territory by 
predominantly indigenous forces on a military or paramilitary basis to reduce the 
                                                 
12 Berel Lang, “Civil Disobedience and Nonviolence: A Distinction with a Difference,” Ethics 80, no. 
2 (January 1970): 156. 
13 Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical & Critical Study (New Brunswick, N.J: 
Transaction Publishers, 1998), 386. 
14 Seth G. Jones, Waging Insurgent Warfare: Lessons from the Vietcong to the Islamic State (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017), 19; Will Irwin et al., Support to Resistance: Strategic Purpose 
and Effectiveness, 2019, https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=48094050. 
15 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unconventional Warfare, JP 3-05.1, vii. 
6 
effectiveness, industrial capacity, and morale of the enemy; a form of an 
insurgency.16 
 
These terms establish a basis of a common vocabulary for the following research. 
Except for terminology that is directly drawn from joint publications, each definition has 
been altered to achieve the broadest characterization that spans the majority of academic 
and government research on the topic. The use of civil resistance and nonviolent resistance 
are used in this work with some distinction. When using the term civil resistance, this study 
looks at a strategic option of resistance primarily using nonviolent means, but not wholly 
without violence. When discussing civil resistance, this study accepts that the activity is 
civil based with the possibility of a limited number of violent acts that are conducted as 
coercive measures. Nonviolent resistance is still the preferred term in most literature and 
these further clarifications on terminology should provide greater context on the activities. 
D. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
Literature analyzing civil resistance has grown exponentially since the Civil Rights 
Era. The surge of writing has substantial increased the understanding of the phenomena, 
but civil resistance is still relatively nascent in studies combining both qualitative and 
quantitative analysis. Much of the research up to Chenoweth and Stephan’s work has 
qualitatively discussed why it is a preferable option for a population, but it still remains 
mostly anecdotal in its application.  
Gene Sharp is the focal point for most research and is considered foundational for 
any understanding of the subject. He founded the modern study of strategic nonviolent 
action and produced a significant scholarship on the subject. His critical works include: 
From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation; Waging 
Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential; his three-part series 
on The Politics of Nonviolent Action; and Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military 
Weapons System. Through these works, modern civil resistance literature is thus typically 
understood through its relationship with Gene Sharp. 
                                                 
16 Joint Chiefs of Staff, I–15. 
7 
1. Civil Resistance Theory Origins 
The foundational authors on civil resistance, prior to Sharp, are relatively narrow 
in scope. The concept of civil resistance maintains a long history, but the notion of studying 
civil resistance is relatively limited in maturity and typically begins with Mohandas 
Gandhi. Gandhi’s original concept of resisting oppression is coined Satyagraha, which is 
commonly translated into English to mean “nonviolent resistance” or “militant 
nonviolence,” although the exact translation is closer to “Truth-Force.”17  Gandhi’s views 
nonviolence, discussed in Speeches and Writings of M.F. Gandhi, as significantly difficult 
and requiring significant self-discipline. He poses that a Satyagrahi, or individual who 
follows nonviolence, will suffer when conducting civil resistance. The Satyagrahi use both 
civil resistance and civil disobedience as a means to redress grievances.18  Gandhi viewed 
his concept of civil resistance primarily through the lens of a religious movement, which 
is how he formulated much of his writing on the subject. Thus, the direction of his work is 
primarily theoretical and philosophical in nature. Despite this lens in viewing civil 
resistance as a religious activity, he demonstrates a surprisingly pragmatic approach and 
emphasizes a highly nationalistic understanding for undertaking civil resistance. 
If Gandhi was the Eastern father of civil resistance, Abraham Johannesburg Muste 
is the American parent. Muste, a pacifist, encourages less aggressive concepts of civil 
resistance using pacifist techniques than Gandhi. He derived his nonviolent 
conceptualization of the topic from his experience as a preacher, union leader, and civil 
rights activist.19  Muste posited, “Nonviolence in a broader sense is not our weakness. It is 
our strength.”20   His essays on civil resistance span a significant timeframe from the 1920s 
to the 1960s. The works discuss a variety of topics on pacifism, covering the Second World 
War, Korea, Civil Rights era, and U.S. Foreign policy. Unlike Gene Sharp’s pragmatic 
                                                 
17 Devi Akella, “Satyagraha: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict Management,” Journal of 
Workplace Rights 14, no. 4 (January 2009): 503. 
18 M.F. Gandhi, Speeches and Writings of M.F. Gandhi, ed. C.F. Andrews (Madras: C.A. Natesan & 
Company, 1922), 451. 
19 Abraham Johannes Muste, The Essays of A.J. Muste, ed. Nat Hentoff (New York, NY: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, 1967), xii. 
20 Muste, 467. 
8 
approach, Muste reveals theoretical musings on nonviolent resistance based on ethical 
grounding, founded on his roots as a religious minister. Muste, as some may suggest, may 
be dismissed for his communist sympathies, but his work with the textile unions 
demonstrates a comprehension of the challenges of isolating the use of violence within a 
civil resistance through application of popular movement strategies. 
Gene Sharp elaborated on Muste’s works and transferred his understandings into a 
practical and analytic framework for waging civil resistance, significantly furthering the 
conversation on political power structures and their weaknesses. Sharp’s most influential 
work on civil resistance theory is From Dictatorship to Democracy. This work is an 
extension of The Politics of Nonviolent Action and was published as a theoretical guide for 
Burmese dissidents during the 1990s.21  The booklet discusses Sharp’s core concepts of 
monolithic and pluralistic government power structures, derived from consent theory. His 
coined terms for state power structures is further discussed in later works and refined in 
The Politics of Nonviolent Action: Part One, Power and Struggle.22  Sharp addition to the 
study of civil resistance is his insights into the inherent weaknesses of authoritarian 
government rule, demonstrating that interaction of power relationships between a 
government or occupying force and the population are primarily always in favor of the 
people.  
2. Rise of the Modern Theorists 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, civil resistance literature gained in 
prominence due to a growth of quantitative and qualitative analysis. Erica Chenoweth and 
Maria Stephan are credited with creating the first “major scholarly book” on the subject 
with Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict which 
discusses civil resistance by using quantitative analysis to prove its efficacy. With these 
                                                 
21 Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation (New 
York: [Jackson, Tenn.]: New Press; Distributed by Perseus, 2012), xi. 
22 Sharp, 26; Gene Sharp, Marina Finkelstein, and Gene Sharp, Power and Struggle, Nachdr., The 
Politics of Nonviolent Action, Gene Sharp. With the ed. ass. of Marina Finkelstein; Part 1 (Boston, Ma: 
Porter Sargent, 2000), 8. 
9 
new works on the viability of civil resistance, more scholars have taken up to the challenge 
to explain the apparent viability of nonviolent resistance as a strategic option. 
Scholars such as Maciej Bartowski, Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall have greatly 
expanded the knowledge of civil resistance in both theoretical and historical studies of the 
field. Bartkowski’s work, Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation 
Struggles provides a series of short surveys on geographically organized nonviolent 
resistance that discusses various national liberation successes and failures and provides 
pragmatic conclusions on their success or failures. His work argues that an increase in the 
diffusion of civil resistance knowledge has increased the success and capability of 
movements around the world.23  Ackerman and DuValls’ history of civil resistance, A 
Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict, provides a historic view on 
nonviolent conflict in three different contexts: an independence movement, civil resistance 
against violent oppression, and nonviolence in civil rights campaigns.24  They conclude 
that violent resistance has inaccurately been “accepted as a medication” for grievances due 
to a combination of globalized media and propaganda efforts from organizations like the 
Tamil Tigers, Ho Chi Minh, Mao Tse Tung, and the Irish Republican Army.25  Both studies 
reconstruct historical cases of civil resistance to provide themes of successful and 
unsuccessful movements. 
Srdja Popoivic related his experiences on civil resistance in his work, Blueprint for 
a Revolution: How to Use Rice Pudding, Lego Men, and other Non-Violent Techniques to 
Galvanize Communities, Overthrow Dictators, or Simply Change the World. He is also a 
founding member of the Center of Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS), 
which provides handbooks and guides for conducting nonviolent research.26  His Blueprint 
for a Revolution describes personal experiences on overthrowing Serbia’s Slobodan 
                                                 
23 Maciej J. Bartkowski, ed., Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles 
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2013), 346. 
24 Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict, 1st ed 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 5–6. 
25 Ackerman and DuVall, 459. 
26 “Publications” (Center For Applied Nonviolent Action And Strategies), accessed February 11, 2019, 
http://canvasopedia.org/publications. 
10 
Milosevic and demonstrates various methods of using the backfire methodology, known as 
political Jiu Jitsu by Sharp, for civil resistance success. His work is very unique and 
provides techniques and theory on conducting civil resistance in a modern society. Popovic 
adds to the literature on nonviolent resistance by providing a youthfulness that is altogether 
absent from other studies on the subject. Whereas individuals can learn the history through 
authors like Ackerman and DuVall, and organizational structures from Sharp, Popovic 
demonstrates a capability to translate the theory into pragmatic options that encourages 
youthful inclusion into a movement. His insights also include a warning on the 
homogeneity problems of violent resistance and the need for a variety of asymmetric civil 
options, specifically described in his work with Syrian civil movements.27  His work 
further identifies iconography as a key element of in civil resistance movements, be it rice 
pudding in the Maldives or a 55-gallon drum with Milosevic’s face on it in Serbia, images 
are crucial to the development and sustainment of a movement. Popovich bridges the 
academic appreciation of nonviolent revolution with the technical capability. 
CANVAS, the Albert Einstein Institution, The Journal of Peace Research, and The 
International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC) have produced a significant repository 
of resources over the last twenty-years, but there is much left to be discussed and 
discovered in the field of Civil Resistance. The Journal of Peace Building and 
Development in volume 12 issued a series of articles on Civil Resistance in Contexts of 
Armed Conflict. These works include relevant material to military operations, such as the 
challenges of Urbicide, violence directed toward urban centers, and Nepal’s transformation 
from violent resistance to civil resistance.28  The Journal of Peace Research also issued 
volume 50, issue 3, covered the understanding of civil resistance and contains Kurt 
Schock’s essential reading of “The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance” and Véronique 
Dudouet’s “Dynamics and Factors of Transition from Armed Struggle to Nonviolent 
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Resistance.” 29  Furthermore, the ICNC provides the largest collection of collated material 
in both film and written form on the topic of nonviolent resistance, curating resources from 
other organization and academic literature. The ICNC’s repository links to the majority of 
influence research created since 2000 on nonviolent resistance and provides the most 
comprehensive set of source material. Sharp’s Albert Einstein Institute, which has become 
dormant since his passing in 2018, provides a catalogue of his writings for further research 
and relevant study material. Popovic’s CANVAS’s research and handbooks are focused on 
community activism and emphasizes techniques at the tactical level, which provides the 
most pragmatic advice out of any of the research material. These organizations provide a 
plethora of material and have managed to organize the rapid growth of study on the subject 
of civil resistance. 
The most significant driver for modern studies on civil resistance is in the 
development of quantitative analysis pioneered by Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephans’ 
journal article “Why Civil Resistance Works.”  This work was followed by a book of the 
same name, restarting the conversation on civil resistance and expanding the research by 
demonstrating a quantitative analysis of its success rates. Their analysis is the first attempt 
to analyze nonviolent and violent resistance to tease out elements for why civil resistance 
might be a more successful option, suggesting that nonviolent civil resistance campaigns 
succeed twice as often as violent resistance campaigns.30  These authors aggregate their 
data from Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes Data Project (NAVCO), 
which is currently in its third version. Chenoweth and Kurt Schock use the NAVCO data 
to further analyze the effects of a radical flank, or contemporaneous armed challenges, to 
see how it may effect success.31  Kathleen Cunningham also uses this data set when 
determining why groups choose either to enter into irregular strategies involving civil war 
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or civil resistance campaigns.32  The development of the NAVCO database has opened the 
ability to provide a complete understanding of how and when civil resistance works 
through quantitative means, facilitating an increase in civil resistance studies never 
available before its creation. Although this dataset has opened up new avenues of study, 
the coding of success in insurgency is difficult to quantify in a binary manner. The 
Sandinista movement in Nicaragua is classified as a failed insurgency in the NAVCO 
dataset for the majority of the years, yet other researchers classify this as a successful 
insurgency that might need a relook of what constitutes a successful outcome by year.33  
As an aggregate of data, NAVCO is relatively correct, but there is challenges in the coding 
to identify when a resistance transitions strategy or ceases one completely. Despite these 
concerns, the NAVCO dataset is evolutionary and has opened up important new avenues 
to peace and conflict studies. 
Although there is an increase of literature supporting civil resistance, its efficacy as 
a strategy is challenged when dealing with ultra-hostile forces or that of a repressive state 
or occupying force. Hardy Merriman and Jack DuVall propose that civil resistance is 
effective against significant repressive regimes; Maria Stephan also suggests that civil 
resistance could work as a strategy against ISIS and posits that civil resistance is a form of 
UW that may be a substitute for military means.34  Timothy Braatz dissents from this 
suggestion and posits that even a successful nonviolent civil resistance campaign may not 
hinder the violence against the population and will fail to garner success. Lorenzo 
Raymond also suggests in his article, “Why Nonviolent Civil Resistance Doesn’t Work 
(Unless You Have Lots of Bombs),” that civil resistance is impotent without outside 
support or the ability of the population to harness enough fear for the state or occupying 
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force to capitulate.35  Michael Peck refutes Chenoweth’s suggestion that ISIS could be 
defeated by nonviolent methods and claims that civil resistance methods would not provide 
enough of a countermeasure to usurp the terrorists strategy of violence.36  Chenoweth and 
Stephan accept these arguments as plausible, but emphasize the efforts of clandestine 
nonviolent civil resistance during these cases overcomes these oppositions to the 
methodology.37  Specifically, that the majority of civil resistance takes forms that are 
below the level of attention of the media and appear more surreptitious than overt. A debate 
on the efficacy of nonviolent civil resistance is one that will continue into the foreseeable 
future where people steeped in traditional warfare doctrines will challenge how and when 
nonviolent civil resistance is applicable. 
3. Insurgency, Guerrilla Warfare 
Insurgent warfare is a different strategic option to a resistance movement and may 
be construed as the polar opposite strategy to nonviolent resistance. An insurgency is 
similar in political objectives to a civil resistance, but differs in methodology. There is an 
overabundance of works on insurgency, specifically the methodology of insurgency. 
Authors have identified many of the effective tactics of successful insurgencies, but these 
tend to highlight only successful cases and discount failures. Additionally, it is difficult to 
analyze the failure of stillborn insurgencies and understand the structural issues at the onset 
of the mobilization phases, similar to ineffective nonviolent resistances. Walter Lacquer, 
Stathis Kalyvas, and Seth Jones provide some of the best qualitative and quantitative 
analyses of insurgencies and demonstrate some of the most convincing quantitative 
answers to the applicability of an insurgency. Even with the robustness of their work on 
the subject, there is much more to analyze.  
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Walter Laqueur’s Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study is a crucial to 
understanding insurgent warfare up to the mid 1970s and it continues to be important for 
understanding the insurgent warfare on a critical level, providing analysis on both 
successful and unsuccessful insurgent endeavors. Laqueur suggests that guerrilla warfare 
is rather common, but suggests that only two cases of guerrilla warfare have ever been 
successful.38  He also posits that guerrilla warfare has significantly changed since Ho Chi 
Minh or Mao and that changes in modernization and technology require updates to the 
study of the phenomenon.39  One of his notable findings suggests that guerrilla warfare is 
decisive when the state or opposing force is unable to commit its full resources, similar to 
Arreguín-Toft’s strategic mismatch, further suggested by Alexander Downes and Kathryn 
Cochran’s “Targeting Civilians to Win?  Assessing the Military Effectiveness of Civilian 
Victimization in Interstate Conflict.”40 
Gaps in Lacquer’s analysis have successfully been filled by Seth Jones in Waging 
Insurgent Warfare. Jones delivers a different tenor to his analysis, recategorizing insurgent 
warfare as relatively successful and somewhat misunderstood. He posits insurgencies bare 
a success rate of 36 percent, with a 29 percent negotiated settlement; he further suggests 
an efficacy in conducting insurgent warfare as a strategic option of the population.41  Jones 
posits insurgent warfare is probably more successful than policy makers believe, and his 
calculations suggest support for resistance movements to adopt an insurgent strategy.42   
One of the greatest challenges to understanding insurgency is determining what 
constitutes success, considering the political nature of the strategy. The previous authors 
looked primarily at success through the lens of either attaining independence, negotiated 
settlement, or failure. Will Irwin’s Support to Resistance: Strategic Purpose and 
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Effectiveness expands the understanding of success by dissecting the United States’ support 
to resistance movements, providing 45 different cases. His unique study identifies the goal 
of U.S. support to resistance in 70 percent of the cases was predicated on disruption.43  
Since a resistance will typically have some form of outside assistance, this is important to 
understanding the influence of support the resistance’s choice. This is noticeable in case 
study of Tibet, whereas the U.S. efforts to disrupt Chinese efforts ran contradictory to the 
Tibetan movement for succession. Irwin’s work is based on U.S. success in their support 
to resistance and lists Tibet as a successful operation, which is true from the CIA’s 
perspective. From the Tibetan perspective this campaign is considered a failure because 
they were never able to achieve their stated goals.44  These distinctions make Irwin’s 
research critical for understanding the conflicting priorities in resistance movements and 
how outcomes to these campaigns are not necessarily binary. 
Stathis Kalyvas’ The Logic of Violence in Civil War is one of the leading modern 
works on violence between the state and population. His work focuses on the understanding 
of civil war, but includes many facets of unconventional warfare to describe the interplay 
that occurs between rival forces as they attempt to vie for supremacy within a state. His 
definition of violence is the use of power to exterminate or control a group for 
supremacy.45  His work studies the dynamics of discriminate and indiscriminate violence 
and the psychological circumstances of civil conflict. His findings suggest that 
insurgencies tend to use selective violence whereas the state is prone to use indiscriminate 
violence.46  Kalyvas’ analysis on civil conflict, including that of insurgency, bridges the 
study of small wars and state conflict. 
Modern joint military and service literature on UW identifies that both insurgencies 
and civil resistance are elements of unconventional warfare, yet doctrine appears biased 
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towards the kinetically focused approach of UW. Joint Publication 3-05: Special 
Operations, defines UW as, “Operations and activities that are conducted to enable a 
resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or 
occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla 
force in denied areas.”  The manual provides scant analysis on civil resistance and contrasts 
it with an insurgency based on the concept that a “resistance movement may not [use 
violence].”  The USASOC Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide furthers this discussion 
of insurgencies and civil resistance by informing the need for different planning and scope 
of each method of engagement. Unfortunately, the material dismisses civil resistance as a 
Title 50, intelligence function, and downplays any further analysis on the subject, implying 
that the activity is outside the purview of SOF activities.  
JP 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare, achieves the best balance out of the preceding 
service literature and identifies differences between insurgencies and civil resistance 
campaigns. Yet, its core premises are biased toward the historical understanding of 
unconventional warfare based on French theory.47  The publication expands on this 
concept and appears to use advances in resistance studies, which have provided some 
significant additions to the publication. The analysis of Civil Affairs activities during UW 
provides the best incorporation of civil resistance and bares striking resemblance to Sharp’s 
concept of pluralistic power.48  The publication tries to make the distinction between a 
resistance and insurgency but tends to muddle up the definitions with some lack of clarity 
on the benefits and drawbacks of each type of operation. JP 3-05.1 has made significant 
strides towards providing a clearer picture of UW, but still lacks some context. 
E. RESEARCH APPROACH 
The research in this thesis uses a combined quantitative and qualitative approach to 
investigate the strategic option of civil resistance and insurgency. The dependent variable 
for this research is a successful civil resistance campaign. The independent variables in this 
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study include: ethnic power relationships within a state, the strategic choices between a 
state and resistance movement, and a resistance’s transition from violence to nonviolence. 
This study also seeks to identify intervening variables that contribute to optimal or 
suboptimal civil resistance practices.  
The study is organized into three sections. The first section is a quantitative analysis 
to determine under what ethnic power relationships a civil resistance is more likely to 
occur. The second section will use game theory to analyze the strategic decisions of the 
state and civil resistance movement. The third section analyzes three case studies of violent 
insurgencies that have transitioned into a primarily nonviolent civil resistance. The 
combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis will provide the basis for identifying 
the most likely environments where a civil resistance might develop and what strategic 
choices might be made in the contested environment. 
In the quantitative section, the analysis uses data from the Nonviolent and Violent 
Campaigns Outcomes (NAVCO) Database,49 Ethnic Power Relationship (EPR) dataset,50 
and the Polity IV Dataset51 to analyze the ethnic power relationships and political 
structures associated with civil resistance. The quantitative section attempts to identify 
under what ethnic power distributions a civil resistance is more likely to occur. This section 
will set the conditions for the initial civil choices proposed by the population in the game 
theoretic model in section two and will provide an insight into the structural conditions in 
the qualitative section of the thesis. 
The game theory section of the thesis analyzes a state and civil resistances’ initial 
strategic choices in conflict. In this section I look at the resistance’s strategic choice 
between an insurgency or civil resistance. It will juxtapose the state’s option of either 
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repressing the insurgency or choosing a COIN strategy of only discriminately targeting the 
insurgents. This section will identify the most probable first choice a resistance movement 
and state will make. 
The qualitative section focuses on violent resistance campaigns which transitioned 
into a successful civil resistance campaign. The study analyzes the resistances of Nepal, 
East Timor, and West Sahara. These three cases provide insight into three different 
outcomes: failed, partially successful, and successful. By looking at both successful and 
failed transitions of civil resistance, this paper proposes to identify commonalities between 
the transitions and what elements led to success and which elements stymied the progress 
of the resistance.  
This research approach pursues a combination of quantitative research, deepened 
by qualitative analysis, that provides an understanding of how an insurgency might 
transition into a civil resistance and the commonalities between successful and failed 
transitions. The combination of both methodologies will fill a gap in the study of how an 
insurgency transitions into a civil resistance. This work will also fill a gap in the study of 
the strategic choices made by a state and population when identifying their courses of 
action. Research is typically focused on either the state’s option to repress civil resistance 
or the population’s tactics to overcome state oppression. By placing these two actors 
together with their opposing strategic options, I argue that we can improve our 
understanding of the environment in which civil resistance decisions are made.  
F. KEY FINDINGS 
The findings reported in this thesis indicate that by examining the ethnic political 
power distribution, it is possible to assess the incentives for the strategic choice of civil 
resistance as opposed to violent conflict. This analysis finds that among powerless and 
discriminated ethnic populations, violent and nonviolent resistance is more probable in 
regions where there are larger numbers of these ethnic groups. Civil and violent resistance 
is also more likely to occur when these groups constitute large percentages of the total 
population of a state. In contrast, when analyzing senior and junior partners in ethnic power 
sharing arrangements, the evidence indicates divergence in the strategic choices of the 
19 
population. Higher numbers of junior power sharing groups within a state are associated 
with lower probabilities for non-violent civil resistance, whereas higher numbers of senior 
partner power sharing groups are associated with higher probabilities for non-violent 
resistance.  
The game theoretic model for the initial strategic decisions between a state and 
resistance movement, indicates that violent conflict is the most likely outcome for both 
players. The model also suggests that a population’s initial choice in the game will 
generally be to resort to violence against the state. Thus, if a resistance is going to occur, 
this analysis suggests that a violent strategy is the most likely outcome. 
In an analysis of violent insurgencies that transitioned to a civil resistance, there are 
a number of commonalities. East Timor demonstrated the ability of a state to maintain a 
mostly homogenized ethnic group against the Indonesian state, achieving a successful 
succession. West Sahara and Tibet demonstrate that state policies of forced changed in the 
ethnic power sharing relationships have restricted the ability of the population to pursue a 
violent resistance and additionally hindered the ability of any civil resistance to achieve 
success. The case studies provide evidence that a strategic choice to conduct a civil 
resistance may be directly related to the capability of the resistance to maintain a violent 
insurgency. In all three cases, the civil resistance gained momentum when the movement’s 
insurgent capabilities were rendered ineffective. 
20 
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II. ETHNIC POWER STRUCTURES AND RESISTANCE 
A. OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH 
Mobilizing a population to challenge an existing power structure, specifically for 
nonviolent civil resistance, is difficult. Specific power structure relationships may give rise 
to increased chances of success for a nonviolent civil resistance over an insurgent resistance 
movement. The goal is to identify what ethnic power conditions may encourage a 
nonviolent civil resistance to manifest as opposed to a violent resistance. The strategic 
choice for a population when choosing nonviolence is typically based on a formula that 
includes foreseen adversarial moves, human resources, and materials.52  Regardless of 
these factors, this study asks if there are predisposed ethnic power relationship structures 
that may increase or decrease the chance for a nonviolent resistance or violent insurgency.  
I posit it should be possible to determine where a civil resistance might occur by 
constructing a database of ethnic power structures, political structures, and state stability 
to predict the outcome of a binary dependent variable of nonviolent conflict or violent 
insurgency. The goal is to identify an association between various ethnic power sharing 
groups within a state and the propensity to either increase or decrease the chance for 
nonviolent actions. These ethnic groups will be looked at through either the number of 
groups within a state or the percentage of the ethnic power sharing group within the state. 
Every regression in this study uses both violent and nonviolent dependent variables to 
identify parallel or inverse relationships between an ethnic population’s choice of 
activities. This analysis will provide one component for analyzing the cases studies in the 
qualitative section of this thesis. 
B. PRECEDING RESEARCH 
Maria Stephan and Erica Chenoweth conducted an initial study on the successes 
and failures of civil resistance which has given rise to renewed interest in the field. Their 
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groundbreaking research demonstrated that nonviolent resistance produces a 57 percent 
success rate over violent resistance with a 29.5 percent success rate.53  Their study 
identifies multiple correlations, to include the participation of nonviolent campaigns, 
political defections, and backfiring mechanisms. While this study is important to 
understanding nonviolent campaign success, it does not identify underlaying power 
relationships between that might predicate a choice between violent and nonviolent 
resistance. 
Chenoweth and Stephan, among other prominent researchers, are still attempting 
to understand under what conditions a civil resistance may occur. With the rise of databases 
such as the University of Denver’s Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes Data 
Project (NAVCO) and the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (EPR), there has been an 
increase in studies on the inputs to nonviolent activities. Studies by Cederman and his 
collogues suggest that power-sharing and grievances-based factors, specifically economic 
horizontal inequalities, provide an explanation for violent conflict.54  Ches Thurber’s 
article on “Ethnic Barriers to Civil Resistance” proposes that social structures of ethnic 
powers are highly important to resistance campaigns, specifically with politically excluded 
groups initiating 21 percent of nonviolent conflicts and 52 percent of all violent conflicts.55  
Thurber also suggests that groups with a senior partner status, or higher, are two-thirds 
more likely to choose civil resistance over violent resistance.56   Gene Sharp posited that 
nonviolent struggles occur in “widely differing cultures, periods of history, and political 
conditions.”57  Yet, Thurber suggests otherwise and that an ethnic power architecture 
might be somewhat deterministic in the choice of nonviolent resistance. Structural 
dimensions of the state, specifically that of ethnic power relationships, may provide a more 
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substantial analysis on where civil resistance might occur and the conditions underlaying 
different actions by the population. 
Ethnic composition of a state is a prominent area of study for violent conflict, to 
include the ethnic genocides in Rwanda, conflict between ethnic Thai and Malay 
populations, and continual conflict between Israel and Palestine. Andreas Wimmer, Lars-
Erik Cederman, and Brian Min questioned how the ethnic composition of the state leads to 
violent conflict. Their findings identify that different state ethnic makeups are causally 
related to the type of conflict within a state.58  Their model suggests armed conflicts are 
more likely to occur where large segments of the population are excluded from political 
representation. They further identify that numerous power sharing interactions between 
ethnic senior partners increase violence, specifically in areas where ethnic minorities have 
a history of political discrimination from a majority ethnic group.59    
Another approach by Erica Chenoweth and Jay Ulfelder identifies that grievances 
of a population may determine the differentiation between violent or nonviolent resistance. 
They suggest civil resistance depends on various civil structures of support to achieve mass 
mobilization. Because of this, grievances within these civil structures may encourage 
nonviolent resistance.60  Their study analyzes proxy metrics for group grievances, such as 
poverty, uneven power structures, distribution of wealth, and social exclusion.61  Using 
twelve separate metrics, they demonstrate repression of the population does not provide a 
significant enough prediction of nonviolent resistance, whereas other models created from 
this study only provide “gross patterns with available data.”62  Ackerman instead suggests 
population capability is far more important than environmental considerations, suggesting 
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the importance of “skills over conditions.”63  These factors identified by Chenoweth, 
Ulfelder, and Ackerman may be components of the ethnic power relationship and 
demonstrated better by calculating the power relationship in a state. 
Rather than study the characteristics that give rise to only civil resistance, it is 
potentially more beneficial to study the difference between insurgency and civil resistance. 
Ches Turber suggests the population’s social movement composition dictates the choice in 
choosing civil resistance, not environmental or economic pressures on the population.64  
He focuses on the ability of a group to mobilize populations as a social network, which is 
significant in the creation of a nonviolent resistance, as an independent variable. If the 
social movement is unable to garner mass mobilization, it will then turn to violent means; 
whereas, when an integrated social movement is part of the larger society, it will tend to 
choose nonviolent means.65  His findings posit that when there is ethnic overlap, in which 
more than one ethnic group has access to power, the chance for civil resistance increases 
from 17 percent to 63 percent.66  His investigation uses network analysis to predict choices 
of violent or nonviolent conflict and warrants further research and possible incorporation 
into theories of nonviolent mobilization.  
C. FRAMEWORK FOR QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
This quantitative analysis adds to the theory that decreased barriers to resistance, 
demonstrated through ethnic power relationships, allows for greater mobilization in a civil 
resistance. This work capitalizes on Wimmer’s theory of nation-state formation and ethnic 
politics as a foundation for analyzing interactions between majority and minority ethnic 
groups within the state. Wimmer posits that within a nation-state, ethnonational political 
legitimacy is important to the defining of a people and rulers, and thus plays a significant 
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role in the formation of the state.67  This creates a desired ethnic homogenization of 
political and social structures in the state which gives rise to grievances of excluded or 
devalued ethnic minorities. Additionally, I will use Chenoweth and Stephans’ mobilization 
theory, suggesting that nonviolent success is dependent upon the capability of the network 
to produce large quantities of participants.68  Thus, we should expect to find more 
occurrences of nonviolent resistance in locations where it is easier to mobilize the 
population, such as where greater homogeneity of a state allows for the mobilization of 
large numbers of a singular ethnic population. Therefore, both the ethnic makeup of a state 
and the ability to mobilize should are critical factors for determining the chance for 
nonviolent resistance. 
This study is predicated on the EPR database from the Center for Comparative and 
International Studies at ETH Zürich. This database provides all politically relevant ethnic 
groups from the years of 1946 to 2017.69  The ethnic groups are categorized as: monopoly, 
dominant, senior partner, junior partner, powerless, discriminated, and self-excluded. 
Senior partner and junior partner groups share power within the government, and the state’s 
executive functions are divided respectively between the groups. Powerless populations 
hold no authority within the government at the national executive level but are not actively 
discriminated against, whereas a discriminated population is intentionally targeted by the 
ethnic power holders of political power. Dominant populations hold power over the 
executive functions of the state and allow “token” membership of minority ethnic groups. 
Monopoly governments exclude all minority ethnic power groups, while the self-excluded 
populations are not discriminated against and choose not to pursue political power. These 
groups are coded by country, number of groups, and as a percentage of the total population 
of the state.  
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The first step is to identify the number of civil resistances and violent resistances 
between the years 1960 to 2006. The data collected from the NAVCO and EPR data sets 
contain 46 years of 11,661 observations on violent and nonviolent resistances. The 
principle regressions in this study contain 6,573 observations. All observations are coded 
by country and year. There is a significant number of observations of violent resistances, 
1,093, as opposed to nonviolent resistances, 280. The observed success rate of violent 
resistances in the dataset is 35 percent, whereas nonviolent resistances succeed 65 percent 
of the time between the years of 1960 and 2006. The identification of success is derived 
from the NAVCO database and coded by year for both violent and civil resistances.  
Figure 1 describes the number of violent and nonviolent resistances between 1960 and 
2006 by year. The y-axis indicates the either the number of resistances or the number of 
successful outcomes per year. The x-axis indicates the year. The red line depicts the total 
number of violent resistances and the blue line the total number of nonviolent resistances 
of the given year. The green line is the total number of nonviolent successes and the purple 
line is the total number of violent successes by year. The number of violent resistances is 
greater than that of nonviolent resistances, yet there is a greater observation of nonviolent 
success rates as opposed to violent success rates. 
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 Timeline of Violent and Nonviolent Resistances70 
This study uses several independent variables commonly identified as significant 
to nonviolent resistance. Chenoweth and Stephens identified that a state which has a history 
of violent resistance is inclined to use the same methodology, whereas a state that uses 
nonviolence will also typically choose a similar method again.71   Another critical factor 
is the size of a state’s population, specifically the amount of individuals who are available 
to mobilize.72  Regime type is also determined to be a critical factor in state instability with 
anocracies having the highest propensity for political instability and thus increased chances 
for both violent and nonviolent resistances.73  These metrics are included as control 
variables for each of the regressions in the study. 
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The models presented here apply various data sources to understand an ethnic 
groups’ access to state power and their potential to conduct civil resistance. The NAVCO 
v2.0 database provides the dependent variable of nonviolent and violent conflict in the 
world.74   The Polity IV Dataset (1800-2016) gives the polity score, measuring the 
spectrum from authoritarian to democratic, for all countries by year.75  These independent 
variables are modelled in units of analysis by country and year between the years of 1968 
and 2006. 
My first hypothesis (H1) suggests that an increase in the number of junior partner 
groups within a power sharing government will decrease the likelihood of nonviolent 
conflict as the ability to mobilize mass populations becomes more difficult between 
disparate goals. Chenoweth and Stephens identify that mobilization is crucial element to 
nonviolent success and suggest that ethnic schisms will be potentially greater in multi-
ethnic power sharing groups.76  Thus, in states with greater ethnic diversity where 
polarization of groups is more likely, it should be more difficult for nonviolent resistance 
mobilizations to occur.  
The second hypothesis (H2) suggests that when the size of a powerless ethnic 
population is larger relative to the total population of the state, nonviolent resistances 
should be more likely to occur. A powerless population may lack the means to wage 
warfare, or participate in government institution, that is on parity with the government. 
Gandhi, during his campaigns against the British, lacked weapons due to the India Arms 
Act of 1878. This limited Indian separatist groups ability to fight in semi-parity with the 
British and may give suggestion to the choice for nonviolent resistance. The powerless 
ethnic population, as a total of the state population, should provide a mobilization 
capability directed towards similar ethnic grievances. This should be most pronounced 
when the population lacks the resources to wage violent conflict. 
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The third hypothesis (H3) suggests that a heightened probability civil resistance 
will occur when a discriminated ethnic power population is large in relationship to the 
dominant population of a state. I also propose that as the number of discriminated groups 
increases, there will be a decrease in the probability of civil resistance. Wimmer, 
Cederman, and Min demonstrated that an increase in the number of ethnically 
discriminated groups within a society increases the likelihood of violent resistance.77  
Higher numbers of discriminated groups may therefore be seen to dissuade collaborative 
efforts to organize a non-civil resistance. In contrast, the percentage of discriminated 
population, as a portion of the total state population, should have a positive association 
with the onset of a civil resistance. As the discriminated population increases as a portion 
of the whole, I posit the development of shared grievances will increase the likelihood of 
a nonviolent resistance.  
D. RESULTS 
The first goal is to look at the relative frequency of nonviolent and violent activities, 
as shown in the kernel density plots in Figures 2 and 3. Each variable was coded by year 
and country, with a nonviolent or violent resistance coded as a binary with zero indicating 
no resistance and one indicating a resistance.  Figure 2 describes the distribution of the 
population a percentage or a number of groups within a state, broken down by senior or 
junior partner power sharing populations, while Figure 3 shows the same variables, broken 
down by discriminated and powerless populations. The density, or relative frequency of 
events for violent or nonviolent civil resistance, is shown on the y-axis. The x-axis shows 
the percentage of the population or the number of ethnic groups within a state. For example, 
we can see that the greatest proportion of nonviolent resistance occurs when the senior 
partner populations represents greater than 50 percent of the total population. In contrast, 
violent resistance occurs more often when the senior partner population represents less than 
50 percent of the total population.
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 Density Plot for Junior and Senior Partner Populations78 
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 Density Plot for Powerless and Discriminated Populations79 
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The results of the core regression models are shown in Table 1. Models 1 and 5 is 
are based on the population proportion variables and analyze ethnic power groups as a 
proportion of the total population. Models 2 and 6 exchange the proportion variable and 
instead count the number of ethnic power groups within a state. Models 3 and 7 focus on 
the powerless ethnic power group as both a percentage of the total population and the 
number of powerless groups within a state. These models include the interaction of the 
powerless ethnic percentage and number of groups, both interacting with the polity of the 
state. Models 4 and 8 focus on the discriminated population within a state as a percentage 
of the total population. These models include the percentage of discriminated populations 
and its interaction with the polity of the state. Models 4 and 8 also include the dominant 
ethnic power group as a constant in the regression. The interaction polity on Models 3, 4, 
7, and 8 are squared. When running regressions without the polity score squared, there was 
no, or a reduced, statistical significance when analyzing both the number of groups or 
percentage of the ethnic population. By analyzing the square of the polity during 
interactions, it allows for a better fit of model. Because the dependent variable, nonviolent 
or violent, is a binary outcome, all models were based on logit regressions. All regressions 
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Table 1. Regression Results: Violent and Nonviolent Resistance 
34 
Figure 4 displays the probability of nonviolent resistance by the number of groups 
in a respective power sharing category within a state. Figure 5 displays the same 
phenomenon by the percentage of the respective ethnic group as part of the overall 
population. In each figure, the color codes represent the effect of a particular ethnic power 
category, while holding all other variables constant at their means. The figures are derived 
from the results of Models 1 and 2, reported in Table 1. As seen in Figure 4, senior partner, 
powerless, and discriminated groups demonstrate an increase in the chance for nonviolent 
action when there are a larger number of the respective group within a society. All other 
groups are statistically insignificant or show decreasing chances for civil resistance. In 
contrast, examining Figure 5, all evaluated groups demonstrate either decreasing chances 
for civil resistance or are statistically insignificant when analyzing the ethnic category as a 
percentage of the population. These figures suggest that civil resistance is less likely in 
highly unified ethnic power structures or in structures which maintain an ability to unify 
under commonalities. To demonstrate the variation between violent and nonviolent 
resistance, Figures 6 and 7 depict the probability of violent resistance by both the respective 
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 Probability of Violent Action by Number of Group 
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Models 1, 2, 5 and 6 demonstrate that ethnic power sharing regimes create a 
divergence in the strategic choices of the population, as seen in Figures 8 and 9. When 
increasing the number of senior partner groups in a state, Model 2 generated a statistically 
significant coefficient of 0.265, indicating a positive effect on the probability of non-
violent resistance, while Model 5 generated a statistically significant coefficient of -0.645, 
indicating a negative effect on the probability of violent resistance. The model predicts 
over a 200 percent increase in the probability for nonviolent resistance when increasing 
from zero to six ethnic senior partner sharing groups and a decrease of 93 percent in the 
chance for violent resistance. In contrast, junior partner groups in Table 1 showed a 
statistically significant coefficient of -0.306 for nonviolent resistance and a significantly 
significant coefficient of 0.244 for violent resistance. As seen in Figure 8, the probability 
of nonviolent resistance decreases by 25 percent when increasing from one to six junior 
partner sharing groups and inversely triples in the chance for violent resistance. When 
analyzing the percentage of the senior partners as a proportion of the population within a 
state, as reported in Table 1, we see a statistically significant negative coefficient of -0.678 
for violent resistance and a corresponding statistically significant negative coefficient of -
2.909 for the effect of junior partners on nonviolent resistance. This demonstrates that 
between ethnic junior and senior partner political sharing groups there are clear differences 
in the strategic choices for resistance based on both the number of groups and their 
percentage of the total population. 
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The analysis of senior ethnic partners and junior ethnic partners suggest a difference 
in strategic choice between violent and civil resistances. In H1, we expected that increasing 
the number of junior partner groups within a power sharing government would decrease 
the likelihood of nonviolent conflict. Model 2 suggests that when the number of junior 
partner groups increases within a state, there will be a decrease in the probability of civil 
resistance and a corresponding increase in the probability of violent resistance. Model 1 
additionally demonstrated that when junior partner increases in percentage of the total 
population, the chance for nonviolent resistance also decreases. This suggests that 
increasing the junior partner percentage and the number of junior partner groups would 
decrease the probability of nonviolent resistance. Correspondingly, increasing the number 
of junior partner groups would be expected to increase the probability for violent conflict.  
H2 proposed that powerless populations choose nonviolent means as a form of civil 
resistance when their population is large in relative size to the state. In Models 3 and 6, the 
effect of powerless groups on the probability for violent and nonviolent resistance is 
positive when analyzing both number of groups and percentage of the population. The 
interaction between the percentage of powerless population and polity was added to see if 
there were any difference in the strategic choice between a violent and nonviolent 
resistance. Figure 10 displays the chance for nonviolent resistance based on the percentage 
of powerless population and the interaction of polity. The color scale indicates the polity 
of the state with red being authoritarian, blue anocracy, and green a democracy. Powerless 
populations appear to increase the probability for a nonviolent resistance in democracies 
and anocracies. Figure 11 looks at this phenomenon by violent resistance and demonstrates 
a similar result as Figure 10. This provides evidence which partially supports H2, indicating 
that a powerless population may choose either a violent or nonviolent resistance as their 
percentage of population increases in relation to the total population of the state, though 
this effect seems to be limited to democratic and anocratic states. 
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H3 suggests there will be an increase in civil resistance when the discriminated 
population within a society is large in relative size to that of the dominant population. 
Model 4 identifies that as the percentage of discriminated population increases, so does the 
chance for nonviolent resistance within democracies. In an anocracy, there is a decrease in 
the probability for nonviolent resistance when increasing the discriminated population as a 
percentage. This suggests that an interaction between the polity of the state and the 
percentage of discriminated population influences a resistance movements strategic choice 
in this specific ethnic populations set. I proposed that this same effect will occur when 
looking at violent resistance, but with greater significance. In Figure 6 this is demonstrated 
with large discriminated populations showing a 229 percent increase in the probability for 
violent resistance. Figure 12 depicts Models 4 and 8 when analyzing the interaction of 
polity. The key difference between discriminated population and their strategic choice is 
that in all polities there is an increased probability of violent resistance as the percentage 
of discriminated populations within the state increases. In contrast, when analyzing 
nonviolent resistance, we see that only in democracies does the probability for nonviolent 
resistance increase as the percentage of discriminated populations increase. H3 also posited 
there would be a decrease in the probability of civil resistance as the number of 
discriminated groups increased. However, Model 2 demonstrates the opposite, with civil 
resistances instead increasing in states with larger numbers of discriminated groups. The 
evidence thus partially supports H3. Discriminated population will tend to choose 
nonviolent resistance in democracies as their population size increases, but not in 
anocracies or autocracies. Additionally, as discriminated group numbers increase in a state, 




 Violent and Nonviolent Resistance by Discriminated 
Population Percentage and Polity 
E. DISCUSSION 
The difficulty in mobilizing multiple ethnic groups to achieve nonviolent 
resistance, as opposed to a violent insurgency is innately linked to the propensity of the 
population to create an in-group and out-group.81  One of the key inferences of this study 
is that less ethnically powerful populations may prefer to choose nonviolent resistance to 
gain power when there is less diversity, whereas higher numbers of disadvantaged ethnic 
power sharing groups may be more likely to choose violent resistance. This coincides with 
previous research by Thurber identifying that ethnic power structures are significant in 
determining the propensity of a group to participate in nonviolent or violent resistance.82  
The greater number ethnic power groups within a state who are disenfranchised and 
seeking power, the greater increase in the chance of violent interactions with the dominant 
ethnic power. But, when there are fewer ethnic groups who have increased percentages of 
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the relational population, the data proposes an increase in the chance for nonviolent 
resistance. This should help identify where nonviolent resistances are more likely to be 
pursued by a resistance as opposed to violent strategy.  
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter posits that it is possible to identify where potential civil resistances are 
likely to occur based on the ethnic power structures within a state. H1 suggested that an 
increase in junior partner groups conducting power sharing decreases the chance for civil 
resistances, as confirmed by Model 2. This suggests a difficulty in mobilizing multiple 
ethnic groups that may be antagonists, or at least indifferent to each other’s success in the 
political environment. H2 suggests that an increase in powerless populations, as both a 
percentage of the population and the number of groups, leads to an increased chance of 
nonviolent resistance, as confirmed by Model 3. One unexpected finding was that an 
interaction between powerless populations and polity appears to show an increase in the 
chance for violent resistance in high polity states, but not low polity states. More study into 
this ethnic subset might suggest that the violent conflict opportunity cost for these groups 
is too significant under certain polity states. Finally, H3 posits that as the discriminated 
population, as a percentage of the state increased, so did the chance for nonviolent 
resistance, though Model 4 showed that this effect was limited to democracies. All three 
models affirm that there is an interaction between ethnic power groups, in terms of 
population percentage and number of groups, and their probability of choosing nonviolent 
or violent resistance.  
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III. GAMES BETWEEN THE STATE AND RESISTANCE 
A. CONTEXT OF THE GAME 
This chapter analyzes the strategic decisions of a resistance movement and the state. 
It questions the initial strategies of the state and population by framing a population’s 
choice of nonviolent civil resistance or violent insurgency against a state’s decision to 
violently target the civil populace or refrain from targeting the populace, such as in 
counterinsurgency. This section uses a game theoretic model as a basis to analyze how civil 
resistances and states make their strategic decisions when in conflict with each other. This 
section will juxtapose Maria Stephan and Erica Chenoweths’ journal article, “Why Civil 
Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict,” juxtaposed to Alexander 
Downes and Kathryn Cochran’s, “Targeting Civilians to Win? Assessing the Military 
Effectiveness of Civilian Victimization in Interstate War.”   
A game is created between the state and the population to determine what strategic 
options each have. Both have dichotomous options in the conflict between each other 
without the ability for a mixed strategy. The population may choose to develop a strategy 
of nonviolent resistance or that of a violent insurgency.83  The state may choose to develop 
a strategy of targeting the population, to include killing and repression, or that of a 
counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy of discriminate targeting. In Figure 13, we play this 
game with four separate outcomes, where the player’s strategies are compared against each 
other. The population has the option of strategy A, nonviolent resistance, or B, violent 
insurgency. The state may choose C, not targeting the population, or D, to violently target 
the population. The outcomes are based on the preferences and strategies of the following 
players. 
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 Game Between State and Population 
The game is analyzed under a set of assumptions. The first assumption is that the 
population maintains only two options, that of nonviolent resistance or a violent 
insurgency. There is no third option using only intermittent violent tactics. Situations that 
devolve into a violent hybrid strategy resemble that of a violent insurgency with similar 
outcomes. Violence may be inevitable during a nonviolent resistance, but it is typically 
isolated from the resistance or it automatically changes into a violent insurgency and incurs 
a similar response from the state.84  Violent insurgent campaigns tend to remain in a violent 
state with few populations able to effectively make a complete switch to nonviolent 
resistance. More often, populations that choose a civil resistance strategy will maintain an 
insurgent threat against the state as a means of bargaining. 
The second assumption is that a state that begins to target civilians has little 
incentive to switch tactics unless unforeseen or external pressures force the state to adopt 
a “no targeting of civilians” strategy. The game only allows a dichotomous option for the 
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state. It has been found that when a state targets the civilian population, it increases the 
probability of success by 34 percent.85  States that target civilians also receive measures 
of effectiveness that feed into senses of immediate gratification, thus encouraging 
increased targeting of the population. Kalyvas suggests that “in an environment where it is 
impossible to tell civilian from enemy combatant apart, it pays to be violent.”86  While this 
runs contrary to good practices of counterinsurgency, as proposed by David Kilcullen and 
David Galula, we assume that targeting civilians is preferred as a primary means to resolve 
conflict for the state.  
Figure 14 depicts the typical options between the population and the state in terms 
of strategy. Combining the Minorities at Risk (MAR) and NAVCO databases, I examined 
the options between ethnic minorities and the state.87  I combined the nonviolent and 
violent campaigns by state and year from the NAVCO database and added the state 
responses to minorities conflicts by country and year. The data is coded by either a 
nonviolent or violent resistance and the corresponding government responses against 
minority groups from the MAR dataset. The density plot identifies each resistance, or lack 
of resistance, and the type of action the state took towards its minority population. 
Government responses are coded as: no repression of the minority population, state 
surveillance of the minority population, harassment of the minority population, nonviolent 
repression, and violent repression that includes physical violence, up to and including, 
killing members of the minority group. The density plot suggests that when the minority 
population chooses a violent or nonviolent option, the state tends to resort to violence 
against the population. While the state demonstrates a possible selection of options against 
a resistance, the decision is simplified in the formal model with harassment, nonviolent 
repression, and violent repression considered as targeting the population vice surveillance 
and no action considered as not targeting the population. 
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 Government vs Population Choices 
The final assumption is that the resistance will prefer a violent methodology over a 
nonviolent resistance, all else being equal, due to the structure of the group and popularity 
of insurgency. Resistance groups are influenced by popular success and romanticism of 
insurgent campaigns, which encourages a preference towards an accepted Maoist style 
insurgency in marginalized groups.88  A group making the strategic decision between 
violence and nonviolence is inherently marginalized if they find no political solution to 
their grievances. Kathleen Cunningham identifies that in resistances of self-determination, 
a population will choose violent resistance over nonviolent resistance during cases of civil 
war.89  Resistances that demonstrate a fragmented organization also demonstrate a 
                                                 
88 Smruti S. Pattanaik, “Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Examining Socio‐economic Grievances and 
Political Implications,” Strategic Analysis 26, no. 1 (January 2002): 121, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160208450028. 
89 Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, “Understanding Strategic Choice: The Determinants of Civil War 
and Nonviolent Campaign in Self-Determination Disputes,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 3 (May 
2013): 300, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313475467. 
49 
tendency for violent resistance over nonviolent methodology.90  Furthermore, Sophie 
Lee’s dissertation on the strategic choice of nonviolent and violent resistance identifies that 
“if a campaign organization is able to launch a violent campaign, it most likely will.” 91 
Both the structure of resistance movements and the romanticism of insurgencies encourage 
a group to choose violence as their first option against state oppression. 
Bounded rationality also plays into the use of nonviolent resistance against a state. 
As the literature on nonviolent movements has proliferated, there has been a steady 
increase in the use of nonviolent methodology from 1960 to 2006, as seen in Figure 1. The 
spread of Gene Sharp’s work From Dictatorship to Democracy precipitated much of the 
conceptualization of civil resistance and has been translated into 31 languages and used in 
a multitude of resistance movements across the world.92  As globalization speeds the 
spread of information to less connected environments, we should expect an increase in the 
strategic choice for civil resistance. 
Based on the listed assumptions, the state and population strategies are ordinally 
ranked based on desired strategy from one-to-four, with four being the best option and one 
being the worst option. This does not account for what is actually the best outcome for the 
given player. Tables 2 and 3 show that the preferred options for the state and the population 
involve the use of violence as the primary option. Figure 15 places the two choices in the 
strategic game by using the ordinal ranking from Table 2 and Table 3.  
90 Cunningham, 300. 
91 Sophie Jiseon Lee, “Guns and Roses: A Study of Violent and Nonviolent Resistance Movements” 
(Dissertation, Duke University, 2017), 55. 
92 Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation (New 
York: New Press; Distributed by Perseus, 2012), iv.  
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Table 2. Population Options in Game 
4: Best – Population chooses violent insurgency; the state does not target the population  
3: Next Best – Population chooses violent insurgency; state targets the population 
2: Least Best – Population chooses nonviolence; state does not target the population   
1: Worst – Population chooses nonviolent; state targets population 
 
Table 3.  State Options in Game 
 
 
 Game between State and Population (Ordinal) 
In the game, both the population and state are analyzed to find the Nash 
Equilibrium, or where no opponent may gain by unilateral improvement. We see the 
population has a dominant strategy of choosing a violent insurgency while the state has a 
dominant strategy of targeting the civilian population. Under these circumstances, the 
common outcome will resort to violence for both the state and population, regardless what 
is their statistically best option. The population’s best choice is to choose violence and the 
state choosing to target the population. There is no reason for either actor to adjust their 





















4: Best – State targets population; populace chooses nonviolence 
3: Next Best – State targets population chooses violence  
2: Least Best – State does not target population; population chooses nonviolence 
1: Worst – State does not target population; population chooses violence 
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option, thus giving both players a sub-optimal choice in the game. Gandhi’s statement that 
“Non-violence is not an easy thing to understand, still less to practice” seems accurate in 
the first look of this game.93  Yet, we also know that the state and population don’t always 
choose a violent response.  
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE STATE AND 
POPULATION 
This game theoretic model attempts to identify the initial choices selected by a state 
and population, irrespective of their optimal outcome. Ivan Arreguin-Toft discussed the 
implications of strategic mismatches between indirect and direct approaches for a strong 
and weak state.94  His analysis is limited to chiefly kinetic forms of warfare and fails to 
mention how these actors choose their respective strategies. This approach poses a question 
on how the state and population choose their initial strategic options. The game suggests 
that the population will tend to adopt a strategy that is statistically inferior, while the state 
will choose the statistically superior option. Arreguin-Toft postulates that an opponent will 
lose in an asymmetric interaction when they choose an inaccurate corresponding strategy 
to their opponent.95  This study poses the possibility that populations are incentivized to 
choose strategies that are inherently substandard against the opponent’s superior strategy.  
While using this approach provides an insight into the choice between states and 
populations, it is limited to the current beliefs of the state and population. Downes and 
Cochran state that there is a downward trend in the effectiveness of targeting civilians from 
1825 to 2000.96  This may be due to the development of international norms of behavior 
and the rise of the global media. Their study also suggests there has been an change in 
outcomes over time, with current numbers suggesting that when a state targets civilian, 
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they are more likely to either lose or end in a draw.97  Given the aggregate statistics of 
Downes and Cochran’s study, there is a possibility that the state’s choice to target civilians 
would significantly decrease in the future, supporting the case for a greater asymmetric 
mismatch between the state not targeting civilians and the civilians choosing their best 
option of nonviolent resistance. The end result remains constant in this situation. The 
population should maintain the superior position throughout the interaction for achieving 
victory by being incentivized to use nonviolent resistance. 
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IV. FROM VIOLENT FAILURE TO NONVIOLENT SUCCESS 
A. WHY POPULATIONS ADAPT THEIR STRATEGIC CHOICES 
When a game between the state and population begins, we expect that a population 
will be inclined to conduct a violent resistance, typically modeling a form of insurgency. 
As communication improves, the resistance leadership may view the option of civil 
resistance as significantly more beneficial to the cause. This may be due to strategic choices 
that render violent resistance untenable or undesirable in the growing global environment. 
Effective resistance movements maintain flexibility, and the boundaries between violent 
and nonviolent struggles typically remain fluid, thus many struggles combine elements of 
both violent and nonviolent resistance.98     
This section will analyze the cases of East Timor, Tibet, and Western Sahara as 
examples of instances where a resistance transitioned from a violent to nonviolent 
resistance and attempt to identify commonalities between successful options and structural 
failures. In the chosen cases, I selected situations where violent and nonviolent resistance 
operated in tandem, although the organizations involved may not be organized under the 
same resistance cadre. Each of the case studies examines the background of how the 
insurgency transitioned into a nonviolent resistance, the ethnic power sharing of the 
respective resistance, and the strategic game between the state and resistance forces. Each 
of these resistances eventually transitioned into a predominantly nonviolent cause, failed 
to reach their objective, or achieved partial success through some form of autonomy.  
B. ANALYZING CASES OF TRANSITION FROM VIOLENCE TO CIVIL 
RESISTANCE 
Before analyzing the case studies, this section will analyze the number of transitions 
from violent resistance to civil resistance and background theory used in the case studies. 
The number of transitions from violent insurgency to civil resistance presents a small 
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quantity of occurrences in which to study. Modern popular transitions include the Arab 
Spring movements, the East Timor succession, and the Basque movements. This section 
also looks at elements of transition, to include conflict intensification, escalation and de-
escalation in conjunction with the idea of self-determination. In providing an overview of 
the elements that compose a transition from violence to civil resistance, it will demonstrate 
common elements through each case study. 
Using the NAVCO database, I identified 19 cases where a violent resistance, 
identified in one calendar year, had a subsequent nonviolent resistance in the following 
year, shown in Table 8. I added four additional cases noted by Veronique Dudouet.99  Out 
of the 23 cases, 22 are resistances by groups that had both an armed and unarmed wing. 
Some of the cases identified maintained an associated violent group, such as the African 
National Congress’s relationship to the Umkhonto we Sizwe. OTPOR stands out as the 
only resistance that didn’t maintain an armed wing, but was classified as a transition due 
to the popular violence in the prior year of their campaigning. I additionally looked at each 
element in the given timeframe, and if they continued to maintain an armed wing while 
transitioning to civil resistance, or if they decided to forego maintenance of an armed wing. 
An identified common theme is that a number of the following elements transitioned to 
civil resistance not out of choice, but because they were unable to maintain actions against 
the state, such as in Nepal and Tibet. Another typical outcome is the element reached their 
desired objective, such as Morocco in 1956, and violent resistance was no longer required. 
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Table 4. List of Violent to Nonviolent Transitions 
YEAR COUNTRY ELEMENT MAINTAINED 
ARMED WING 
TRANSITIONED EVENTUAL SUCCESS 
Argentina 1978 Montoneros Yes Yes Yes 
Cameroon 1956 Union of Cameroonian Peoples Yes No No 
Chile 1965 Peronists Yes  Yes Yes 
Cyprus 1957 & 1958 Greek Cypriots Yes Yes Partial 
East Timor 1989 FALINTIL Yes Yes Yes 
Guatemala 1996 Guatemala National 
Revolutionary Unity 
Yes Yes Yes 
India 1958 Hindu-Muslim Nationalists Yes No No 
Ireland 1994 & 1999 IRA Yes Yes (2005) Yes 
Morocco 1956 Moroccan Nationalists Yes Yes Yes 
Nepal 2006 Communist Party of Nepal No Yes Yes 
Palestine 1987 Fatah Yes Yes No 
Papua New 
Guinea 
2000 West Papua National Liberation 
Army 
Yes No No 
Russia 1997 Chechens Yes Yes No 
Rwanda 1956 Hutus Yes No No 
South Africa 1990 African National Congress Yes, in partnership 
(Umkhonto we Sizwe) 
Yes Yes 
Sri Lanka 1972 Tamils Yes Temporarily No 
Tibet 1987 Gu Chu Sum Movement Yes Yes No 
Western Sahara 1982 Polisario Yes Yes Yes 
Yugoslavia 2000 OTPOR No Yes Yes 
 Others not identified as calendar year transitions 
Egypt 2002 Jama’a Islamiya No Yes Yes 
Iran 2006 Peoples Mujahadine Partially No No 
Spain (Basque) 2011 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna No Yes No 
Mexico 1994 Zapatista Army of National 
Liberation 
Partially Yes No 
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Conflict escalation and intensification may address the transition of conflict from 
violent to nonviolent means. In an environment of conflict escalation, one typically 
observes rises in both social tension and outright violence during the struggle. Conflict 
intensification describes an increase in the visibility of a struggle from a hidden campaign 
to open struggle.100  Thus, a resistance will take the form of conflict intensification as it 
moves from the mobilization phase to engagement phase, demonstrating visible signs of 
resistance against the state. This resistance may immediately display in the form of a 
violent outburst or grow in intensity from vocal denouncement to violent resistance. The 
opposite of this model is that of conflict de-escalation, or the transition from an armed 
struggle to that of an unarmed struggle, or nonviolent conflict with the state.101 De-
escalation may take the form of transition from violent conflict to political inclusion or a 
transition to a resistance movement, which might maintain a violent arm. During conflict 
de-escalation, the resistance typically appears to maintain an armed wing as a signaling 
element of capability and resolve. Nepal demonstrates conflict de-escalation, where the 
strategy of a violent resistance against the Peoples Republic of China transitioned from an 
insurgent strategy to primarily nonviolent means and de-escalation from open resistance to 
surreptitious mobilization. The choice to de-escalate takes multiple forms and one model 
isn’t necessarily applicable to the various cases. Both conflict escalation and de-escalation 
provide a framework for understanding how resistance fluidly transitions between optimal 
strategies. 
Conflict escalation tends to be visually noticeable to analyze, whereas conflict de-
escalation is far more difficult to analyze. The four key de-escalatory methods for a violent 
resistance include: demilitarization and nonviolent mobilization; development of 
nonviolent arm while retaining violent means; shift to negotiations with subsequent shift 
to nonviolent means; and leadership-less, non-endorsed transition to nonviolent means.102  
                                                 
100 Simon Fisher, ed., Working with Conflict: Skills and Strategies for Action (New York: Zed Books: 
Distributed in the USA exclusively by St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 7. 
101 Dudouet, “Dynamics and Factors of Transition from Armed Struggle to Nonviolent Resistance,” 
404. 
102 Dudouet, 405. 
57 
The transitions in de-escalation are deliberate. Also, within the globalized environment, 
the ability for more detailed planning within self-determination groups facilitates a more 
detailed process for de-escalatory measures.103  As populations gain access to information 
on tactics and success rates of nonviolent and violent resistances, we should witness 
modern insurgent elements more often de-escalating to some form of nonviolent 
representation, such as political representation, while maintaining a violent means of 
coercion against the state.  
Another reason why a group may choose violent or nonviolent means of resistance 
comes from their desire for self-determination. Self-determinism suggests that a 
population, acting with free will, should have the ability and right to shape their 
government and destiny.104  In the pursuit of self-determination, a population chooses 
whether or not to work within the government, or to choose a second option that may 
include civil resistance or an insurgency. Access to a political solution is predicated upon 
the population’s, or resistance movement’s, view of what is a possible outcome of the 
situation. If a population foresees an ability to achieve self-determination through the 
existing political means, they will tend to accomplish this through the political process.105  
If a population believes there is a political apparatus that allows for the reconciling of 
grievances, they will tend to use the available structures that require the least amount of 
effort and resources. For nonviolent and violent resistances there is a large cost in both 
manpower and resources, thus making these decisions difficult for self-determination 
movements.  
Nonviolent resistance appears likely when a population is excluded from the center 
of a political structure and where violent resistances are not able to be maintained. Civil 
war, or insurgency, is three times more likely during self-determination efforts when there 
is a safe haven in an adjacent state and there is a greater fragmentation in power-sharing 
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groups that are excluded or discriminated against.106  East Timor and Sri Lanka 
demonstrated an inability to maintain the violent resistance movement due to a lack of safe 
haven, and Papua appears to be currently experiencing the same dynamic. Kashmir, on the 
other hand, maintains violent insurgent activities with safe havens in both India and 
Pakistan for operating insurgent groups. Tibet maintained a violent resistance, while being 
supported by the United States, but failed to maintain safe haven status and was rendered 
impotent in their struggle for independence. Geography thus also appears to partially 
circumscribes the strategic choice for either violent or nonviolent resistance. 
1. East Timor Background 
The world censures those who take up arms to defend their causes and calls 
on them to use non-violent means in voicing their grievances. But when a 
people chooses the non-violent path, it is all too often the case that hardly 
anyone pays attention. It is tragic that people have to suffer and die and the 
television cameras have to deliver the pictures to people’s homes everyday 
before the world at large admits there is a problem.107 
The East Timor resistance achieved independence in 2002 following a failed 
insurgency and successful transition to civil resistance. Although East Timor is still 
struggling with its newly found independence, it is slowly adapting to international norms 
as one of the world’s youngest nations. The Timorese were at the center of international 
attention from the Catholic Church and used to increase relations and foreign military sales 
between the United States and Indonesia. The Timorese overcame both domestic and 
international pressures to achieve independence. 
Timor received its first independence from Portugal in 1975, just as the Marxist 
organization Revolutionary Front for the Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) began 
guiding the Timorese independence movement. The importance of East Timor’s 
nonviolent transition resides in the evolution of FRETILIN. Following a coup in Portugal 
in 1976, known as the Carnation Revolution, and the mounting communist group 
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FRETILIN, the Indonesian government conducted a preemptive attack against East Timor 
followed by its forced assimilation as Indonesia’s 27th Province.108  Indonesia’s attack on 
East Timor initiated two decades of violent insurgency by FRETILIN forces that eventually 
transitioned into a nonviolent resistance when the guerrilla forces were rendered impotent 
on the battlefield. 
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FRETILIN, prior to the 1976 invasion, was unifying the population for self-rule. 
FRETILIN, formerly known as the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT) 
which was formed in 1974, was a significantly more aggressive resistance movement born 
out of Timorese youth and students influenced by the global social developments of the 
1960s. FRETILIN rapidly developed social programs focused on strengthening cultural 
values, reinforcing tribal affiliations, and supporting a burgeoning Timorese 
government.110  The liberal populations of East Timor supported the efforts. The antithesis 
of FRETILIN was the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), supported by farmers and the 
more conservative populations of East Timor. UDT advocated for the incorporation of East 
Timor into Indonesia, which created conflict with FRETILIN. This caused a split in 1974 
that started civil conflict and a civil war in 1975.  
FRETILIN created the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor 
(FALINTIL) in response to the onset of civil war with UDT and subsequently proved 
successful in the 43 days of civil conflict.111 The Democratic Republic of East Timor 
(DRET), created following the civil conflict, was developed in anticipation of an 
Indonesian invasion. DRET was the overarching political organization with FRETILIN, as 
the primary means of fighting the Indonesian invasion with its conventional force. 
Timorese youth, primarily unemployed, flocked to FRETILIN and FALINTIL as a 
response to Indonesian heavy-handedness. The Indonesian government additionally 
marginalized the same youthful demographic by excluding them from large sectors of the 
economy, with Indonesians providing other ethnic Indonesian immigrants employment 
over native Timorese.112  Thus, the educated Timorese youth were marginalized and 
without potential educational opportunities, providing an opportune population for 
recruitment to a resistance movement. 
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FALINTIL transitioned to guerrilla activities in 1978 following a series of defeats 
by the Indonesian military. The resistance was subsequently placed under the control of 
the National Council of Revolutionary Resistance (CRRN) in 1981.113  The Indonesian 
military, sensing success, transitioned to a highly aggressive and brutal counterinsurgency 
(COIN) campaign to eliminate FALINTIL guerrillas occupying mountainous hold-outs. 
The Indonesian military conducted population resettlement, employed “death squads” to 
eliminate potential FALINTIL supporters, and led kill/capture operations against 
FRETILIN and FALINTIL leadership.114   Indonesia effectively neutralized FALINTIL 
forces, and by the mid-1980s FALINTIL was unable to conduct conventional operations 
against the Indonesian forces thus leading to their transition to limited guerrilla attacks.115 
Indonesian marginalization of the CRRN and FALINTIL precipitated the 
development of the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) in 1987. This 
organization attempted to unify the different political ideologies and segments of the East 
Timor society under a central political organization and forego its Marxist 
underpinnings.116  CNRM transitioned into the National Council of Timorese Resistance 
(CNRT) in 1998, dropping the derogatory term of Maubere in an effort to better unify the 
population.117  Maubere was associated with Portuguese colonialism and Timorese 
barbarism, but has since been used as a rallying term for Timorese culture. UDT re-unified 
and joined with the CNRT in 1998, along with other smaller separatist groups, upon 
realizing that Indonesian goals and methodology were not comporting with the UDT’s 
interests to maintain a conservative Timorese ethnic group. 
A sub-organization to the CNRM, and eventually the CNRT, was the Frente 
Clandestine, or Clandestine Front. This organization provided resistance capability for the 
Timorese, on behalf of the CNRM, and signaled the transition from violent to nonviolent 
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methods of resisting Indonesian occupation. The organization was composed of three 
distinct branches that helped the CNRM achieve greater international and national support. 
The first branch coordinated resistance activities internally and internationally, organizing 
demonstrations against the Indonesian government. The second branch organized 
politically active students and participated in “sit-ins” at the U.S. Embassy and the Asia 
Pacific Economic Conference (APEC).118  The third branch was composed of East Timor 
students and Indonesian supporters who attended Indonesian universities. This group, 
composed of the East Timorese Student’s Association (IMPLETIM) and National 
Resistance of East Timorese Students (RENETIL) engaged in pro-democracy debates, 
coordinated with Indonesian humanitarian rights organizations, and detailed Indonesian 
military abuses to the Indonesian government.119  The Clandestine Front was instrumental 
in the expansion of CNRM and CNRTs’ efforts to expand the independence campaign 
when FALINTIL’s guerrilla movement failed to maintain momentum against the 
Indonesian military. 
The Catholic Church provided support to nonviolent resistance parallel to the 
Clandestine Front. The population owes its primarily Christian outlook, with elements of 
Animism, to their Portuguese colonization. The invasion and potential incorporation of 
East Timor by Muslim Indonesians created a social backlash on religious grounds. The 
Catholic leadership of East Timor spoke out against Indonesian annexation through public 
statements, challenging policies that threatened Timorese cultural practices, school 
curricula, and religious practices.120  The Timorese Catholic leadership regarded the 
invasion, and subsequent influx of Muslim immigrants into the economy, as an attack 
against East Timor’s religious heritage and identity. Nobel Prize winner, Bishop Carlos 
Filipe Ximenes Belo stated the Indonesians “are intent on Islamization” and were 
attempting to convert the Timorese youth to Islam. The Catholic Church provided a 
mouthpiece for Timorese to share their grievances with an international audience and 
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served as a source of institutional power for those willing to speak out against Indonesian 
activity. 
East Timor transitioned into a primarily nonviolent movement in the 1990s, and the 
return of the UDT to the Timorese power structure solidified its front against the 
Indonesian state. The transition was not without conflict, as the Indonesian military 
arrested and attacked both civilians and Catholic Church workers.121  The transition from 
a violent insurgency to nonviolent resistance was planned and executed through the well-
established organization of the East Timorese. East Timor lacked the ability to maintain an 
insurgency and successfully transitioned to a methodology that allowed continued 
resistance. 
2. East Timor Power Sharing 
East Timor demonstrated no significant power sharing between 1975 and 1995. The 
Timorese are classified as powerless by the EPR data set in 1975 at 0.005 percent of 
Indonesia’s total population. During the conflict, Indonesia is comprised of one dominant 
ethnic group, 12 politically irrelevant ethnic groups, one discriminated group, and two 
powerless groups.122  As of separation, the Timorese are composed of a number of smaller 
ethnic groups, but the whole of the population are collectively referenced as Maubere.123  
What makes the East Timor situation unique is that it is geographically separated from 
other power sharing groups within Indonesia along a geographic and cultural boundary. 
While increases in ethnic diversity favor the adoption of a violent resistance over a 
nonviolent resistance, the Timorese were nationally unified through the Catholic Religion, 
composed of 81.4% of the population in 1989, and a general ethnic identification as 
Maubere.124 The Timorese were able to maintain ethnic group cohesion throughout the 
conflict. 
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The Timorese population demonstrated that although they were ostensibly 
politically powerless in the Indonesian government, they were able to unify the population 
against the dominant power center when their guerrilla arm of the resistance was rendered 
ineffective. The ability to mobilize an ethnically homogeneous population against an 
external occupying force allowed the population to transition from a violent to a nonviolent 
means through a broadly accepted national determination effort. 
3. East Timor Game 
East Timor initially escalated the conflict to the most undesirable solution for long-
term success, whereas the Indonesian government initiated their potentially most 
successful option. Indonesia began with aggressive targeting campaigns to kill or capture 
FALINTIL forces and eliminate their capability to wage warfare. Indonesia was initially 
successful in eliminating the threat, marginalizing FALINTIL capabilities to limited 
guerrilla strikes. FALINTIL chose to conduct a violent defense against the Indonesian 
military, that was both trained and armed to subjugate an insurgency. Both organizations 
utilized their kinetic forces as their primary means to redress their grievances. In the 1980s, 
FRETILIN adjusted the game by introducing the CNRM and CNRT along with 
transitioning from a violent to primarily nonviolent subversive fight. FALINTIL 
maintained the armed wing as a non-partisan subordinate to the CNRT to ensure a 
deterrence threat against the Indonesian government.  
As suggested, the Indonesian government initially resorted to a violent annexation, 
targeting both the FALINTIL forces and the population. This strategy facilitated a metric-
based approach to the campaign that continued until the transition to COIN operations in 
the early 1980s. During this time, the strategic mismatch favored Indonesian operations as 
FALINTIL guerrilla operations were isolated and impotent, and the political apparatus had 
not yet adopted a more advantageous strategy. With the creation of the Clandestine Front, 
under the CNRM, the Timorese regained the strategic advantage. The ability to increase 
condemnation of the Indonesian government while receiving vocal support for the creation 
of the Timor state from the international community and Catholic Church created 
advantages for the movement. Additionally, continued targeting of FALINTIL and the 
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Timorese population by the Indonesian government swayed the strategic mismatch in favor 
of the Timorese separatists.  
4. East Timor Conclusion 
The East Timor transition from a violent resistance to primarily nonviolent means 
demonstrates the ability to employ the backfire effect in order to gain independence from 
an occupying force. East Timor demonstrated a de-escalation strategy of transitioning to 
primarily nonviolent methods while maintaining potential violent means. Although the 
guerrilla force was rendered ineffective, the fact that the Timorese maintained their 
potential capability provided strategic deterrence to Indonesian activities. This suggests 
that a potentially armed-wing of a resistance movement may provide a threat capability 
that pushes the opponent to choose a sub-optimal strategy. The maintenance of FALINTIL 
allowed for flexibility in negotiations. The guerrilla force also induced the Indonesian 
government to adopt a heavy-handed approach, providing greater backfire by the 
international community towards Indonesian COIN efforts. East Timor also benefited from 
the geographic isolation of a generally homogeneous population of ethnic Mauberes.  
The Indonesian invasion and occupation between 1976 and 1980 led to a death toll 
of up to 230,000 Timorese out of a total pre-invasion population of 650,000 individuals.125 
 A second estimate places the Timorese casualty tally at 24-to-26 percent of their total 
population.126  An additional 300,000 East Timorese were forced into West Timor as 
refugees during the Indonesian invasion.127  Despite, or perhaps due to, the massive losses 
by the Timorese people, the Timorese population was able to mobilize against the 
Indonesian government in a way that allowed a challenging of the state with minimal 
violent reprisals. In the end, the East Timorese pressured the Indonesian government to 
concede, leading to a granting of independence in 2002 and the creation of an independent 
East Timor state. This was a result of garnering sufficient Indonesian and international 
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attention to atrocities and the political deprivation of the East Timor population.  The East 
Timorese resistance success suggests that nonviolent resistance techniques can be applied 
against highly aggressive COIN and pacification efforts. This is not to suggest that 
nonviolent means alone would have been sufficient, but the proper mixture of guerrilla 
forces under FALINTIL and nonviolent means under CRRN provided an effective unified 
front against the Indonesian aggression. 
5. Tibet Background 
A blow on the nose of a hated enemy, 
Is surely more satisfying, 
Than listening to the advice 
Of benevolent Parties128 
The actions of the Tibetan resistance demonstrate how a resistance can achieve 
limited success following the transition from an insurgency to civil resistance. Although 
Tibet received a limited autonomous region in China, it remains a territory of the Peoples 
Republic of China (PRC) and continues to engage in forms of civil resistance to maintain 
their culture and identity. Tibet maintains a history of violently expelling foreign invaders, 
including the defeat of Manchu in the early twentieth century. However, Tibet was unable 
to defeat a Chinese Communist invasion in 1950 and has since attempted multiple forms 
of resistance to maintain Tibet as autonomous, starting with violent resistance and evolving 
to the current strategy of civil resistance. The country has been the focal point for proxy 
warfare by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) against the Chinese Communist 
government, which concluded in a failed violent insurgency. 
China invaded Tibetan territory in 1950 under the auspices that Tibet was a historic 
territory and thus naturally under the rule of the state. Mao Zedong attacked the territory 
with 40,000 Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) troops and quickly overwhelmed the Tibetan 
defenses.129  The stated goal of China was liberation of the state from imperialist 
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influences.130  The United Nations (UN) and other neighboring states were in no place to 
intervene, and China was quickly able to assume control of the area with no significant 
international objection. Activities in Korea limited the UN’s ability to intervene in Tibet or 
to even pay notice to the events. China demonstrated their brashness in this attack, 
conducting operations while simultaneously meeting with Tibet’s peace negotiators in 
Delhi.131  After seven months of PLA operations, Tibet was forced to sign the Seventeen-
Point Agreement with China that conceded autonomy and control for the future of Tibet, 
thus ending independence of the Tibetan state. Few of the 17 points in the agreement were 
ever kept by China. 
The Tibetans initially viewed the Seventeen-Point Agreement as a means of 
keeping their culture while providing China a form of symbolic power over the region; 
both turned out to be incorrect. Following the agreement, China initiated a systematic 
removal of Buddhist culture, destroying the vast majority of over 6,000 monasteries, 
leaving only 12 remaining.132  China began an immediate emigration of ethnic Han 
Chinese into Tibet, forcing ethnic change of the region with a goal of five Han per every 
Tibetan citizen in the region.133  Tibetan cultural clothing and music was banned or 
destroyed; China viewed Tibetan items and demonstrations as forms of resistance against 
the revolutionary government.134  The boldest move by the Chinese was their appointment 
of the Panchen Lama, the second most holy person behind the Dalai Lama. The Dalai 
Lama accepted the individual who was termed the “Mao’s Panchen” or the “Communist 
Panchen Lama” by the Tibetan people and emphasized the “godlessness and arrogance of 
their conquerors.”135 The grievances of the Tibet citizens continued to grow in the 1950s 
and led to the start of its resistance movement and the First Tibetan Uprising from 1956 to 
1959. 
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The First Uprising was not the first resistance against the Chinese government, but 
the conglomeration of multiple resistance acts that led up to 1959. Tibetan angst against 
Communist ideology, brutal military crackdowns against the population, destruction of 
religious identity, and the abduction of citizens sparked a movement to defend Tibet and 
the Buddhist ideology. In 1956, the Tibetan populace started spontaneous violent 
oppositions against Chinese democratic reforms.136  The revolt started in the Khampa 
region, known for a more aggressive culture of resistance and independence than the 
Buddhist populations in Lhasa, and was coined the Khampa Uprising. This revolt spread 
across Tibet, encouraging guerrilla warfare against the Chinese. The Jenkhentsisum 
(JKTS) also initiated resistance activities against the Chinese starting in 1951. The JKTS 
was founded by the Dalai Lama’s older brother, an influential monk and aristocratic 
official.137  The organization focused on gaining external support for Tibet, meeting with 
Indian and U.S. representatives, and the facilitation of financial and technical aid to Tibet. 
The JKTS operated in conjunction with the Dalai Lama, but was also known to operate 
without his knowledge or approval, with mixed results.138 The 1955 Mönlam Prayer 
Festival Incident demonstrated the JKTS’s ability to mobilize a peaceful protest against 
Chinese oppression and led to the imprisonment of three leaders of the movement. The 
Phala clique, another resistance group, are a collection of Buddhist Monks who made a 
secret pact to resist the Chinese. These pacts emphasize the clandestine nature of their 
resistance to oppose Chinese oppression and activities that target the monastic class.  The 
monks have resisted occupation by opposing the Chinese currency exchange of Tibetan 
paper money to Chinese Renminbi Yuan. The monks also encourage non-compliance by 
the monasteries and Tibetan government.139   By the end of 1956, the Khampans, JKTS, 
and Phala clique were all interested in taking up arms to drive out China.140  The Khampa 
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movement and the JKTS garnered the attention of the CIA, prompting the support of the 
guerrillas through covert assistance and the training of 259 Tibetans at Camp Hale, 
Colorado.141  The years leading up to the 1959 uprising set the stage for a primary effort 
led by insurgent guerrilla operations and civil resistance. 
The CIA declared their support for the Tibetan resistance in 1956 with an official 
start to the campaign in 1959. CIA officials stated it was improbable for the guerrilla 
movement in Tibet to expel Chinese authority, but they did think a sufficient effort would 
be enough to galvanize international support for the Dalai Lama and restrict Chinese 
actions in Tibet.142 Once the CIA realized the value of first hand documentation they were 
receiving from the Tibetan insurgents, they changed their focus from supporting a Tibetan 
resistance as a means to disrupt the Chinese to using the insurgents as intelligence 
operatives on behalf of the CIA. The Tibetans, weary of the new CIA objectives, continued 
hit-and-run tactics against the Chinese forces and tacitly continued collecting PRC 
documentation from raids that could be considered a great benefit for CIA operations 
against China. The CIA disapproved of continued Tibetan insurgent activities, but allowed 
the operations to continue as long as Chinese documents from the activities continued to 
flow back to the CIA. The changing nature of CIA’s objectives and support foreshadowed 
a reduction in U.S. support for Tibetan independence and its eventual downfall. 
The Dalai Lama’s exit from Tibet in 1959 also corresponded with an exodus of a 
significant portion of the Tibetan resistance movement. Realizing that the movement was 
unable to manage as a guerrilla force against a well-armed and organized PLA, the Dalai 
Lama publicly requested a change from violent resistance to nonviolent compliance. In 
1974 the Dalai Lama requested the halting of the guerrilla movement, organized out of the 
CIA Mustang Camp in Nepal. He stated that “for many years you have risked your lives 
and struggled for our cause. I know the present situation will cause you much 
disappointment. However, we must try and achieve our objectives through peaceful 
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means.”143  The remaining resistance fighters turned in all their weapons, with some 
committing suicide out of distress. Many of the remaining guerrilla fighters still live in 
Nepal or India. The end of the CIA sponsored resistance was the prima facie end of violent 
resistance against the PLA, as Tibet no longer maintained the means or capability to 
continue insurgent activities. 
The circumstances leading to Tibet’s first major nonviolent resistance started with 
liberalization of the region. The PRC government, headed by Deng Xiaoping, started 
repealing former Chairman Mao’s repressive policies and encouraged the revival of 
Tibetan culture and education.144 Many of the former restrictions on the Tibetans, to 
include dress, education, and music, were removed from civic life, and the Chinese 
Panchen Lama toured the countryside encouraging the study and use of the Tibetan 
language.145  Along with these measures, China also encouraged the immigration of ethnic 
Chinese into Tibet. These settlers were better connected with supply chains in mainland 
China and were able to assume primacy in trade and other commercial enterprises, such as 
groceries. While liberalization helped the development of the region, it also exacerbated 
the grievances of the Tibetans against the Chinese population and government.  
The Second Uprising in 1987 was an outgrowth of the liberalization of the 1980s 
and became the noticeable transition point from violent resistance to civil resistance. The 
Dalai Lama’s 1987 speech to the Congressional caucus on human rights in Washington, 
D.C., precipitated a PRC response.146  The Chinese government broadcasted their 
condemnation of the Dalai Lama on Tibetan television, angering the ethnic populations 
and monks who still maintained reverence for the exiled leader of the religion. The Chinese 
condemnation sparked a protest by the Drepung Monastery in September. The monks 
marched around their temple holding signs supporting the Dalai Lama, continuing the 
protest to local Chinese administrative offices. Violent repercussions by the PRC backfired, 
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mobilizing the population against perceived injustices and leading to further protests of up 
to 3,000 people.147 This “watershed” event marked significant changes in the resistance 
strategy, encouraging other Tibetans to follow in similar nonviolent protests and 
demonstrations against the PRC.148  The protests of 1987, combined with the liberalization 
of Tibet, provided the outlet for Tibetans to demonstrate their grievances publicly with 
lower barriers to participation as opposed to the actions of the guerrilla forces.  
The Third Uprising in Tibet occurred in 2008, spurred on by greater liberalization 
brought about by globalization. The PRC restricted the use of the Tibetan language and 
posting of the Dalai Lama’s photos in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR).149  To 
overcome these restrictions the Tibetans turned to investment in arts and culture as a 
bulwark against PRC oppression. Tibetan artists perfected the use of metaphors to 
overcome Chinese censorship, such as the 2006 song “Hope and Sorrow,” which discusses 
the desired return of the Dalai Lama, Panchen Lama, and Karmapa to Tibet.150  
Additionally, Windows Vista added the Tibetan font in 2007, allowing for the use of the 
native language within the TAR, and more importantly in communications with Tibetans 
in exile.151  The increased ability to communicate brought about a revitalization of Tibetan 
ethnic mobilization against the Chinese government. Like the liberalization of the 1980s in 
Tibet, the 2000s liberalization allowed for greater mobilization and communication in 
Tibet. 
The 2008 Third Uprising occurred when the population responded to violent images 
of PRC policemen attacking Tibetan monks, broadcast on Chinese state television services 
and through local Tibetan mediums. The protests, or riots, occurred much to the surprise 
of the exiled government and, inconveniently for the PRC, one month before the 2008 
                                                 
147 Dorjee, 44. 
148 Truth Is Our Only Weapon: The Tibetan Nonviolent Struggle, Nonviolence in Asia Series 
(Bangkok, Thailand, 2000), 17. 
149 Truth Is Our Only Weapon: The Tibetan Nonviolent Struggle, 51. 
150 Knaus, “Official Policies and Covert Programs: The U.S. State Department, the CIA, and the 
Tibetan Resistance,” 63. 
151 Dorjee, “The Tibetan Nonviolent Struggle: A Strategic and Historical Analysis,” 65. 
72 
Olympics in Beijing. The protests were primarily comprised of nonviolent civil resistance 
tactics with some incidences of vandalism and attacks against ethnic Han Chinese, which 
were rapidly exploited by Chinese propaganda.152  Civic protests continued through 2008 
using nonviolent protests, self-immolation, symbolic gestures, destruction of Chinese 
flags, and noncompliance. The Chinese government responded with mass arrests and 
torture, leading to over 6,800 detentions of protesters in 2008 with many individuals still 
unaccounted for.153  Additionally, the PRC closed Tibet to tourism and journalists, reduced 
the number of monks allowed in the main monasteries, and caused the collapse of the talks 
between the Dalai Lama and Chinese government.154  The uniqueness of these protests is 
they were not confined to the TAR, but included: 55 protests by lay groups, 20 protests by 
monks, 17 protests by students, and 4 protests by nuns.155  The resistance protests remained 
primarily nonviolent in the majority of these cases and demonstrated the dispersion of 
grievances outside the TAR and throughout the entire Tibetan plateau. The locations of the 
protests are shown in Figure 17. 
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 2008 Protests in Tibet from 10 March to 12 April, Marked 
in Red Squares156 
6. Tibet Power Sharing 
Tibetan power sharing within the PRC demonstrates a lack of autonomy and control 
by the Tibetan minority groups. China’s response to the 1959 resistance and subsequent 
occupation was the encouraged immigration of Han Chinese into Tibet. China split Tibet 
into both an autonomous region and the three separate provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, and 
Sichuan. The Chinese government brokered the 17-point agreement with the Tibetan 
leadership in 1951 which stated that “national regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas 
where national minorities shall have freedom to develop their spoken and written languages 
and to preserve or reform their customs, habits and religious beliefs.”157  A significant 
portion of this agreement has been breached by the Chinese government, to include the 
destruction of Buddhist Monasteries, the usurping of the Panchen Lama’s position, removal 
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of the Dalai Lama from power, preventing the local government to reform “of its own 
accord,” and China’s deliberate grab of natural resources from the Tibetan plateau, namely 
the mining of minerals. The agreement was conducted without the knowledge of the Dalai 
Lama or the standing Tibetan Government in 1951 and presented to the delegates in an 
ultimatum that stated liberation would either be peaceful or “armed.”158  From the start the 
TAR, the Tibetan population was de jure a discriminated population and de facto a 
powerless population. 
The percentage of ethnic Tibetans in the TAR and associated areas is contentious. 
The Chinese government census of the region states that Tibet’s population in 2011 was 
approximately 3 million, with 90% of the population as ethnic Tibetans.159  Additionally, 
the Han population in the TAR composed 8.17 percent of the population. These figures are 
highly debatable with the combined Chinese focus on ethnic Han migration to Tibet and a 
policy of “sinicization,” or assimilation of Tibet under ethnic Han acculturalization.160  
The International Campaign for Tibet suggests that half the population of Lhasa is 
ethnically Han Chinese, with 60–70 percent of the government composed of ethnic 
Tibetans.161  An article on Chinese populations in Tibet in 1993 suggests that Han Chinese 
possibly compose a third of the population in Tibet when adding in workers, military, and 
other government populations.162  China’s challenge to these figures is that they only 
consider the TAR to be Tibetan and the other surrounding provinces are specifically 
Chinese and not included into figures of Chinese migration.163  The demographics in Lhasa 
and other areas are further changing with the completion of rail service from mainland 
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China to the Tibetan plateau that has hastened sinicization and the migration of the Han 
populations. 
Tibetan power sharing in the government is also limited due to poor representation. 
China conducted a purge of Tibetan authorities in the 1980s, leaving only a few “Tibetan 
replacements whom they could trust,” to run the government.164  By the mid-1990s 
Tibetans were typically considered “unqualified” to hold critical positions in the 
government or communist party with no Tibetans holding any position higher than deputy 
party secretary and only comprising approximately 30–40 percent of the Tibetan regional 
party organization.165  Furthermore, the EPR database considers the Tibetan minority in 
China as powerless in the 1980s to 1990s and discriminated against from 2000 up to 2017. 
The Tibetan leadership has no access to senior decision-making in the communist party 
and, despite the Chinese reports, have only token abilities to administer government policy 
in the TAR through Chinese approval. 
The powerless situation of the Tibetan population suggests we would expect their 
chance of conducting nonviolent resistance to be lower than that of a violent resistance. 
Recent reporting has indicated that Tibetan youth are primed to return to a violent 
resistance against the PRC. While the religious populations are still encouraging a steadfast 
focus on nonviolent resistance in Tibet, there is a growing call to return to violent resistance 
by the youth and economically disenfranchised elements.  
7. Tibet Game 
Tibet demonstrates the Chinese government’s de facto response of state 
surveillance, harassment, and violent repression against the Tibetan population. When 
looking at the game for both China and Tibet, it is highly foreseeable that China would 
immediately resort to a violent response to Tibetan resistance. We must also consider that 
China has been able to eliminate the backfire effect in the international community through 
economic and diplomatic pressures. Although the Free Tibet movement has brought the 
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plight of the Tibetans into the international media, there has been a lack of external 
condemnation of China and support of their policies. China is able to mitigate the national 
and international outrage through manipulation and control of the media and thereby the 
narrative, eliminating the use of Backfire Model through covering up the actions of the 
state.166 
The game between Tibet and China favors the PRC as long as they are able to limit 
the ability of Tibetans to communicate with the outside world and keep it as an internal 
issue to the state. If the Tibetan population is able to project the injustices past the “Great 
Firewall of China” and garner international condemnation of the Chinese government it 
might gain more support. Furthermore, it must project to sympathetic ethnic Han 
populations the civil abuses in Tibet. Until those aspects of the game can be accounted for, 
we can expect China will continue to win the game and furthermore use the same tactics 
against other minority groups in China. 
8. Tibet Conclusion 
Tibet attempted multiple resistances that began with an aborted violent resistance 
and transitioned into a decades long civil resistance campaign. There are a few 
circumstances that make it a unique resistance campaign. The Dalai Lama and 
approximately 60,000 Tibetans emigrated during 1959 to India and Nepal, reducing the 
leadership and potential resistance participation. Additionally, immigration of Chinese Han 
from the mainland to the Tibetan region has restricted the ability of the Tibetans to mobilize 
by limiting the ability to develop strict in-group and out-group relationships. Another 
crucial element is the number of Chinese military personnel stationed in Tibet to ensure 
the security of the region. The PRC maintains a significant security apparatus that is able 
to disenfranchise the Tibetan population and reinterpret the narrative on resistance protest 
in Tibet and change the perception of what is happening to the greater Han population. The 
violent insurgency was stillborn due to the withdrawal of any serious support from the 
United States; a semi-effective civil resistance has been initiated in its place. We can expect 
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the civil resistance to continue on a long-term basis and extract small concessions from the 
Chinese government as modernization occurs on the Tibetan Plateau, but a successful 
secession of Tibet from China is not probable until the dynamics of the situation 
significantly change. 
9. West Sahara Background 
See how they chimed in me 
the drums of war, 
and I responded by preaching peace 
so that my grandfather’s soul 
rest in peace and in my desert 
and with my jaima only peace prevails.167 
 
West Sahara is an example of the catastrophic after-effects of poor planning during 
the transition from colonialization combined with a population’s search for national self-
determination. West Sahara has a rich history of violent resistance against colonialism and 
foreign aggressors.168  The occupied area of West Sahara, also called the administered 
region, is the result of proxy wars between Algeria and Morocco. West Sahara contains 
many elements for a successful insurgency, yet a nonviolent movement not only developed, 
but partially succeeded in the progress for a potentially independent state of West Sahara. 
However, as of 2019, Morocco still claims rightful administration and ownership of the 
administrated region with a potential for a politically compromised Sahrawi autonomous 
region as part of the Moroccan state. This possible solution has previously been suggested 
as an option for the Saharawi minority. 
Western Sahara, a Spanish colony from 1884 to 1975, became a proxy battlefield 
for Mauritania and Morocco over primordial claims. The Saharawi claim a historic right to 
the land and culture that dates back prior to the creation of either the Moroccan or West 
Saharan state. In the early twentieth century, France, Spain, and Morocco vied for power 
over the regions of the Rio de Oro and the Saguia el-Hamara, now identified as West 
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Sahara. France assumed control over Mauritania while Spain retained the areas of West 
Sahara. The Sahrawis executed guerrilla operations against the French and Spanish during 
the colonization. France eventually eliminated the majority of the local Sahrawi resistance 
in 1934 after nearly a century of resistance and pacification operations.169  Although the 
Sahrawis successfully thwarted Spanish pacification efforts, France demonstrated a higher 
degree of coordination and were superiorly armed, leading to French administration of the 
region.170  This colonization period in Mauritania and West Sahara was rife with insurgent 
warfare by the local population. 
In 1956, France granted Morocco independence. Spain retained Western Sahara out 
of fear of the Moroccan Army of Liberation. The army was composed of groups of 
Moroccan militias who fought for independence from France and Spain in order to secure 
the region under Moroccan administration.171  The Moroccan Army of Liberation 
supported the Sahrawi guerrillas, known as the Saharan Liberation Army, in an effort to 
unify the area of West Sahara and Morocco, resulting in a fierce campaign against the 
Spanish that included assassination of Spanish officials, skirmishes, and ambushes.172  The 
French and Spanish, in a concerted effort, pacified the Sahrawi population by 1957 and 
rendered the Saharan Liberation Army impotent. Members of the Saharan Liberation Army 
who participated in the conflict against Spain fled to Morocco after their defeat, most of 
them destitute, relying on the Moroccan government for assistance.173  By 1972 the UN 
called for Spain to hand over the territory of Western Sahara to the people and allow their 
right to “self-determination and independence.”174  In response, Spain handed over the 
lands to Mauritania and Morocco in 1975 believing there wasn’t significant support for the 
development of an independent West Saharan state. This decision ignited a proxy war 
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between Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and other foreign nations over the future of 
West Sahara that is still in contention in 2019.175 
The Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguiet el Hamra and Rio de Oro 
(Polisario) is the result of the Saharawi conflict and fight for self-determination to govern 
themselves. The Sahrawis established the Polisario to fight the Spanish in 1973 and 
proposed an independent and non-aligned state, publishing a 27-point program of human 
rights and land reform.176  Algeria supported and molded the Polisario as a proxy force 
against Spanish and Moroccan influence in the region, providing training and support to 
the Polisario in the 1970s.177  When Spain ended their colonialization in 1976, the Polisario 
developed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a political arm of the 
movement.178179  The Polisario focused their attention on ejecting both the Mauritanian 
and Moroccan forces. Mauritania withdrew from the conflict in 1978 and subsequently 
recognized SADR. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), later named the African 
Union (AU), officially recognized the Polisario, praising their ceasefire efforts with 
Mauritania and endorsing SADR’s push for self-determination.180 The Royal Moroccan 
Armed Forces (FAR) continued operations against the Polisario, despite the OAU 
recognition, securing 80-percent of Western Sahara by 1991, yet falling short of defeating 
the guerrillas who continue to maintain bases and support in Western Algeria.  
Morocco’s success lay in the creation of the world’s largest minefield and manned 
barrier, over 1,600-miles long, consisting of 26 known minefields and unexploded cluster 
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bomb sites.181/182  The barrier known as “The Berm,” completed in 1987, physically and 
symbolically demonstrates the segmentation of the Sahrawi populations. This barrier 
effectively eliminated the Polisario from conducting operations out of Algeria into West 
Sahara and halted any ability for operatives in West Sahara to establish safe havens. The 
Polisario and Moroccan government signed a UN-brokered ceasefire in 1991, officially 
ending the guerrilla movement of Polisario, which by this time was rendered unable to 
maintain significant pressure on the FAR. This further led to the creation of the United 
Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to mediate the 
conflict to a peaceful solution. The Polisario were forced into a strategic transition, moving 
from the nationalist struggle to a diplomatic organization.  
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 Western Sahara Control183 
The partition and conflict divided the Sahrawi population, leading to the creation 
of West Sahara’s Sahrawi camps, both in Western Sahara and externally in Algeria. The 
nonviolent resistance originated in these camps and evolved into increasingly complex 
movements that spread to cities and student rights groups at the universities. The Sahrawis 
escaped the attacks by the FAR in the late 1980s and established six refugee camps in 
Algeria, located near the town of Tindouf, which is currently supported by MINURSO. 
Sahrawi populations that remained in the Moroccan-controlled West Sahara continue to be 
a minority population in West Sahara. This is further exacerbated by the Moroccan 
government moving ethnic Moroccan populations into West Sahara. The ethnic Moroccans 
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are now double the population size of the Sahrawis.184  The remaining Sahrawi population 
now consists of refugees in Algeria, the administered Sahrawi population in Morocco and 
West Sahara, and the diaspora. 
In 1999, the Sahrawi population took control of the resistance from the Polisario 
and initiated the first Intifada in occupied territories of Western Sahara, foregoing the 
typical guerrilla attacks that were popular under the Polisario resistance.185  In the West 
Saharan occupied city of Al-’Ayun, students conducted “sit-in” demonstrations in an effort 
to increase Sahrawi attendance in Moroccan universities. These demonstrations attracted 
other Sahrawi activists advocating for accountability of Sahrawi disappearances at the 
hands of the Moroccan government. The demonstration also brought the support of the 
Moroccan Union of Unemployed University Graduates.186  The Sahrawi’s goals for these 
protests were initially limited to social and economic gains and provided a metric for how 
Morocco would react to future civil resistances.187  Moroccan police responded harshly to 
these demonstrations, as anticipated, and energized the civil resistance, increasing its 
intensity and attracting more Sahrawi and disenfranchised Moroccans to the cause. 
The Second Intifada, known as the Intifada Istiqlal, also originated in Al-’Ayun in 
2005.188  At this time the resistance groups began to distance themselves from the 
Polisario, taking the lead in resistance movement against the Moroccan occupation.189  
Other smaller, nonviolent civil resistance activities also occurred between the first and 
second intifada, but were not significant enough to mobilize mass attention as the 
demonstrations in Al’Ayun. The Second Intifada was precipitated by the movement of a 
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Sahrawi prisoner from Al-Ayun to Morocco, upsetting the prisoner’s parents and local 
community. These nonviolent protests were once again met with violent repression from 
the Moroccan police. The backfire from these events spread news of the intifada to the 
towns of Zemla, Ma’atallah, Smara, and Dakahla in West Sahara, Tan Tan and Assa in 
Morocco, and Universities in Agadir, Marrakesh, Casablanca, Rabat, and Fez.190  
Moroccan police further exacerbated the situation by killing a protester, Hamdi Lembarki, 
marking him as the first Intifada martyr in series of deaths that would occur before the 
resistances completion in 2006.191  This was the first time that “first generation” Sahrawi 
nationalists led the Intifada, making the 2005 resistance significantly different from other 
earlier movements in terms of its approach and also its youthful political structure.192 
                                                 
190 Stephan and Mundy, “A Battlefield Transformed: From Guerrilla Resistance to Mass Nonviolent 
Struggle in the Western Sahara,” 14. 
191 Stephan and Mundy, 16. 
192 Mundy, “Autonomy & Intifadah: New Horizons in Western Saharan Nationalism,” 264. 
84 
 
 Polisario Organizational Chart 
Polisario and SADR have since attempted to expand their reach into developing 
internal resistance platforms and support other nonviolent organizations, such as NOVA 
Sahara Occidental, part of the International Institute for Nonviolent Action (NOVACT). 
Polisario is inherently limited in their capability to infiltrate Moroccan territories and relies 
on organizations within Morocco and their occupied territories. NOVA, as one of the 
principle organizations, provides resistance capabilities and execution of nonviolent 
campaigns. Platforma Gritos Contra el Muro Marroqui additionally provides nonviolent 
resistance in Polisario-occupied West Sahara, conducting artistic campaigns and 
demonstrations on the east side of the Moroccan berm.193  The significant challenge is that 
the Polisario organization is not physically located in West Sahara and the associated 
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resistance groups do not share the philosophy as the Polisario leadership. The result of this 
challenge is the development of parallel resistances that are not necessarily connected or 
supporting a unified cause. 
10. West Sahara Power Sharing 
Power sharing within West Sahara remains a challenge to the Sahrawi population 
in Morocco. Sahrawis are estimated to be only one-quarter to one-third of the total 
inhabitants of Western Sahara. The Sahrawis are powerless in the state and after an 
ambitious effort of the Moroccan government, the ethnic Moroccans now outnumber the 
Sahrawis two to one. Power sharing has become constricted, as the Moroccan government 
will not let any candidates run for office that support any form of independence for West 
Sahara.194  The occupied areas are allowed 13 representatives in the Moroccan Parliament 
out of a total of 515 total representatives. Freedom House categorizes the political freedom 
of West Sahara as seven out of seven, the worst rating, signifying the Saharawi population 
maintains no political freedom.195  The Moroccan government actively prosecutes 
individuals who attempt to vie for independence or policies that are contrary to the 
Moroccan policy of an occupied West Sahara under Moroccan governance.  
Morocco offers the solution of an autonomous region that would increase the 
Sahrawi participation in government and allow for increased political power both within 
their region and with the Moroccan government, but this option remains unrealized and 
unsupported by the Saharawi population. By granting an autonomous region, it would still 
remain in the hands of the Moroccan population that maintains a two-to-one or greater 
population advantage over the native Sahrawis. Additionally, the granting of the 
autonomous region would not provide for the reintegration of the Polisario, SADR, and the 
reunification of the population. This would effectively leave the Sahrawi living in the 
Algerian displacement camps. Ahmed Lakhrif, presumably speaking on behalf of the 
Sahrawi population, stated that Morocco’s autonomy proposal is the only possible way 
                                                 
194 “West Sahara Profile,” Profile (Freedom House, 2018), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2018/western-sahara. 
195 “West Sahara Profile.” 
86 
forward in resolving the crisis.196  Autonomy appears to be the most likely option for the 
West Saharan state, although the majority of the Sahrawi population does not support this 
possibility. If there isn’t a move towards some form of political solution for West Sahara, 
there is a possibility of an escalated resistance that blends both violent and nonviolent 
tactics. 
Power sharing in West Sahara is further complicated by SADR and Polisario 
attempts to govern from Tindouf in Algeria. SADR and the Polisario provide governance 
and security for Tindouf, along with security for MINURSO forces in Algeria and 
Polisario-controlled West Sahara.197  While the SADR maintains a political structure 
developed to maintain organization in the displacement camps, they have minimal ability 
to project their political will, and furthermore, have no capacity for governance in West 
Sahara. Morocco violently suppresses any support for independence and support for the 
Polisario movement. SADR is therefore powerless as a political group within West Sahara 
and too insignificant in numbers to be a viable political force. 
11. West Sahara Game 
Morocco routinely targets Sahrawi citizens through detentions, murder, and police 
brutality to establish state control of the region. Arabs comprise the dominant population 
of Morocco at 59%, powerless Berbers at 39% and the discriminated-against Sahrawis at 
1.6% of the population, with others composing the remaining 10.4%.198  West Sahara 
maintains an estimated 619,000 citizens, with an estimated 200,000 Sahrawis. Another 
estimated 100,000 Sahrawis live in refugee camps in the vicinity of Tindouf, Algeria.199  
The power sharing makeup of West Sahara suggests the newly created minority ethnic 
Sahrawis will choose a violent resistance over a nonviolent approach. A poll conducted by 
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NOVA in 2014 suggests that 62 percent of refugees, between 18 and 40, in Algeria support 
renewed violence against Morocco.200   
One reason for choosing nonviolent civil resistance over a return to insurgency may 
rest in the discriminated population’s access to external support. The Polisario maintains a 
limited ability to support the Sahrawi population in West Sahara, due to both geographic 
separation and barriers to communication. The lack of safe haven to build a guerrilla force 
and infiltrate West Sahara has forced the Sahrawis to organize with available resources that 
support civil resistance over a continued insurgency. While the Sahrawi population has 
veered toward the strategic decision of nonviolent resistance, there is a possibility for them 
to revert to their violent insurgent strategy. Abd Erahman Mohamed from Libertad y Paz 
stated to the UN meeting on West Sahara in 2017 that if “the United Nations did not adopt 
resolutions that reaffirmed the rights of the Sahrawi people, they would take their rights by 
any means necessary.”201  It is probable that if the Polisario is able to create movement 
across the berm and a safe haven within Algeria or other neighboring regions, that a violent 
insurgency might reemerge. As long as the Sahrawi populations are constrained, we should 
expect them to remain with their strategy of civil resistance. 
12. West Sahara Conclusion 
One reason for choosing nonviolent civil resistance over a return to insurgency may 
rest in the discriminated population’s access to external support. The Polisario maintains a 
limited ability to support the Sahrawi population in West Sahara, who are both 
geographically separated and communicatively separated from the resistance force. The 
lack of a safe havens to build a guerrilla force and infiltrate forces the Sahrawis to organize 
with available resources that don’t lend themselves to insurgent activities. 
The Polisario currently does not have the access or placement to move the civil 
resistance of West Sahara to a successful conclusion. Organizations such as NOVA will 
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have to mobilize and generate support for the civil resistance internally. To achieve an 
effective “backfire” effect on Morocco, the resistance must increase its ability to generate 
global awareness outside MINURSO’s limited capability. The Sahrawis are in a difficult 
position as they are a considered a fairly liberal Islamic population.  Conservative Middle 
Eastern nations are wary of supporting the significantly more liberal Saharawi by putting 
pressure on Morocco to grant succession or autonomy. 
The West Saharan and East Timor civil resistances are often examined in parallel, 
with continuing partnerships between the two ethnic populations. Both areas are the result 
of the post colonialization land grabs by the more powerful ethnic groups in the area. The 
Timorese and Saharawi insurgencies were also both eliminated by the occupying state. 
Timor’s Jose Ramos-Horta lamented the ability of East Timor to achieve independence 
after decolonization whereas Western Sahara is still occupied by a foreign state. Ramos-
Horta, a supporter of the Saharawi plight, identifies that foreign powers have a “misguided 
belief that stability in the southern Mediterranean can be bought with policies that will 
increase the instability of the Sahara.”202  Both cases are typically seen as very similar 
circumstances with different outcomes, specifically with the ability of East Timor to garner 
international attention and the West Saharan resistance largely ignored on the international 
stage. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The cases of East Timor, Tibet, and West Sahara illustrate three examples where 
an insurgency transitioned into a civil resistance. East Timor is the only case where, 
following an insurgency, the civil resistance led to the population’s desired goal, 
specifically that of independence and national self-determination. Tibet received 
autonomous status within China, yet is still plagued by a lack of political autonomy within 
their region and continual political discrimination within the PRC. West Sahara remains an 
occupied territory of Morocco and is challenged by a mobilizing element within the 
occupied territory that is disconnected from the Polisario with their own goals and 
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grievances. In these three cases, however, there are some commonalities in what constitutes 
successful practices and what has impeded the movements’ abilities to succeed.  
The ability to maintain political unity and strength within the disputed area is 
clearly critical for maintaining momentum and success. East Timor maintained their 
political power within the state through FALINTIL and was able to redevelop the 
organization even as the insurgency was beaten by the Indonesian forces. The critical 
element of developing the Clandestine Front allowed the East Timorese to challenge the 
Indonesian occupation forces and additionally gain support by Indonesians attending 
schools on Java and West Sumatra. The ability to coordinate these activities also provided 
a unified narrative.  
In Tibet, the loss of the Dalai Lama in 1959 along with thousands of his supporters 
hindered the resistance movement. The resistance was plagued by a segmented population 
that included CIA-sponsored insurgents and a monastery-supported civil resistance that 
was not coordinated. The monastery took the leadership role in the transition to civil 
resistance, but was plagued by a disconnect with the Dalai Lama and the wider diaspora 
for support. Additionally, with the creation of the TAR and three other regions 
administered by China, it was improbable they would be able to unify the Tibetan plateau.  
The West Saharans continue to be plagued by the inability to unify their political 
challenge to Morocco. The SADR and resistance groups within West Sahara have different 
priorities and grievances against the Moroccan government. When the berm was created in 
West Sahara, it effectively ended the insurgency and halted a safe haven external to 
Algeria, thus segmenting the population. During European Union and UN investigations 
into a potential solution for the West Sahara occupied territory, there continue to be two 
parties arguing for Sahrawi independence, one located within Morocco and the SADR.203  
From these observations, it appears to be critical that the political mobilization is 
coordinated between the insurgency and civil resistance during their transition.  
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The second challenge during the transition from insurgency to civil resistance is the 
maintenance of the ethnic population’s demographics against outside emigration of the 
more powerful group. In West Sahara and Tibet, the occupying nations “watered down” 
the population by emigrating more politically powerful ethnicities into the region. In West 
Sahara, there appears to be little possibility of the Sahrawis exercising political control over 
the region. The ethnic Arabs currently outnumber the native Sahrawis and any political 
vote will continue to repress any native representation. Likewise, in Lhasa, the Tibetan 
population is now considered to be equal with the ethnic Han population. The diluting of 
the ethnic density of the region appears to be significant in restricting the ability of the 
resistance movement to gain momentum. The Chinese sinicization of Tibet is the 
prominent method for changing the dynamics of ethnic power sharing in the region to a 
group that shares in-group identities and beliefs with the dominant power-sharing element. 
East Timor also benefited geographically due to their location. The Indonesian government 
did not attempt to move Sumatran or Javanese populations to East Timor, thus maintaining 
a homogenous population. The Timorese were able to maintain a unified front through the 
FALINTIL and the Catholic church that allowed for unification throughout their resistance. 
If ethnic density maintenance is important to the preservation of the resistance, then tactics 
must transition when the demographics change. This is similar to East Timor using 
RENITIL to mobilize Javanese and Sumatran college students to speak out on behalf of 
the East Timor cause. 
Finally, during the civil resistance there must be a transition from insurgency to 
civil resistance that links the two participating populations while maintaining the capability 
to perpetrate an insurgent threat.  Insurgencies are inherently secretive and exclusionary in 
nature. While populations may support insurgent movements, the available population who 
may actively support their kinetic activities remains small. A civil resistance increases the 
inclusion of the population, which is crucial to its success. The civil resistance relies on the 
lowering of barriers and encouraging mass popular activities and support. The transition 
from the insurgency to civil resistance must enable the population to act in proxy of the 
insurgent activities. East Timor provides the best evidence for this. When FRETILIN was 
unable to maintain activities against the Indonesian forces, FALINTIL was able to leverage 
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the grievances for activities with significantly lower barriers to entry. The population was 
able to exhibit their grievances through public acts, religious proclamations, and civic 
demonstrations. In contrast, the Tibetan resistance failed to link the insurgency’s transition 
to civil resistance. The nature of the CIA-driven insurgency provided no linkages to the 
civic grievances in Lhasa, and the population was unable transition the insurgent activities 
to civil resistance. Likewise, when the civil resistance took hold during the second uprising, 
there was no fear of an insurgent force in tandem with a civil resistance to challenge the 
PRC. Similarly, the creation of the West Saharan berm eliminated the insurgent threat and 
disconnected the insurgency from any civil resistance effort. Once the Polisario insurgency 
was limited to Algeria and areas east of the berm, it was no longer a threat to Morocco. 
Thus, the Sahrawis were unable to completely transition to civil resistance. This suggests 
that during a transition to civil resistance, the insurgency or threat of insurgency must 
remain somewhat credible. In the strategic game, the transition appears to precipitate a 
strategic change in choice for the state when an insurgent force is maintained as a credible 
threat. The removal of the insurgent force from the calculation allows the state to continue 
the punishment of population without fear of repercussion. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES? 
This thesis analyzed ethnic power structures, proposed a game theoretic model, and 
examined three separate case studies to determine elements of resistance that potentially 
lead to a civil resistance outcome. The research first asked if there is any distinguishable 
ethnic power sharing division that promotes a civil resistance as opposed to violent 
insurgency. Secondly, using a game theoretic model, I described the likely initial strategic 
choices between a state and resistance movement. Finally, using a selection of case studies, 
I suggested that there are common elements that contribute to the outcome of a resistance 
campaign which transitioned from violent insurgency. This research is predicated on 
previous studies that highlight the viability of civil resistance. I posit, that if civil resistance 
is more effective, then it requires a more in-depth analysis of the elements that lead to a 
successful civil resistance outcome. 
1. When Ethnicity Matters 
Ethnicity in violent and nonviolent resistance demonstrates an in-group 
functionality that allows for mobilization. When the ethnic power group is limited in the 
number of groups, but larger in the percentage of the total population, there is a greater 
ability for the population to mobilize from a violent insurgency to a civil resistance. The 
ability of the ethnic power group to universalize common grievances is important in 
achieving broader participation. Both the quantitative and qualitative analysis presented 
above demonstrates that there is a trend that encourages civil resistance when the 
population is able to unify under a similar group, especially as it grows larger as percentage 
of the total population. The study also demonstrated a divergence in the strategic tendencies 
between senior and junior ethnic power sharing groups. This finding warns that states that 
increase the number of junior partner sharing groups in the political structure, by granting 
them only token representation, may increase the probability of violent resistance and 
decrease the probability of civil resistance. In contrast, states that increase the number of 
senior partner groups, who are granted more substantial access to state power, may 
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decrease the probability of violent resistance and increase the probability of non-violent 
civil resistance. 
Ethnicity, in the case of East Timor, increased the ability of the population to 
coalesce around a single identity. This identity of the Maubere culture was mobilized to 
unite ethnically similar populations against the outgroup of Indonesians. Through the 
flexibility of FALINTIL and FRETILIN, the group abandoned their communist 
underpinnings, allowing for broader acceptance of the resistance message. The Timorese 
unified under a singular ethnic population upon the return of the UDT in 1998, after 24 
years of separation between the ethnic power sharing groups. East Timor demonstrated a 
case of a powerless ethnic population binding together to achieve a successful civil 
resistance succession. 
West Sahara and Tibet demonstrate very different approaches to ethnic power 
sharing. In both cases, the dominant ethnic power group took steps to reduce the percentage 
size of the persecuted ethnic group by a process of sinicization or emigration. In an effort 
to “water down” the Tibetan ethnic minority group, the Chinese transplanted ethnic Han 
onto the Tibetan plateau. In West Sahara, the ethnic Moroccans are also following a policy 
of emigrating ethnic Moroccans into West Sahara, reducing any ability of the West 
Saharans to mobilize as an ethnic ingroup. Both Morocco and China appear to have found 
method for countering a popular resistance by changing the ethnic makeup of a region in 
favor for the more powerful ethnic group.  
2. The Opponent and Violence 
The second section suggested a game theoretic model to identify the potential initial 
outcomes of decisions by a resistance movement and state. A key observation of this model 
is that a state’s initial response is primarily weighted towards the targeting of the civilian 
population. The resistance is also encouraged towards a violent strategic option, including 
insurgency. However, if the game were to be played in iterations, the calculus of the options 
might change based on environmental and social factors. For instance, if an insurgency is 
able to maintain a safe haven and funding, as seen in places like Vietnam, then it may be 
encouraged to maintain its violent strategic option. But if the safe haven and insurgent 
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elements are rendered ineffective, such as in East Timor, then a transition to civil resistance 
may become more likely. 
Future research on the interaction between civil resistance and insurgency should 
focus on the elements underpinning this strategic choice. The game theoretic model only 
analyzed the initial outcome of the interaction between the resistance and the state. The 
case studies identify that the strategic options occurred in iterative decision-making cycles. 
A further analysis of the game between the state and population using an iterative theoretic 
model could provide a list of elements that change the calculation for the resistance and 
state. One element of the game that should be included in future research when examining 
iterative games is the ability of the resistance to achieve a backfire effect in both internal 
and external audiences. East Timor was able to change the strategic environment by 
incorporating an external audience of the Catholic Church and promoting international 
condemnation of Indonesian activities. The Timorese were also proficient at targeting 
Indonesian students and activists to promote the resistance on the Timorese behalf. The 
Tibetans were unable to garner any significant support from the Han population, although 
they achieved support from the international community. The Tibetans still maintain 
visibility for their issues, publicizing the violent activities of the PRC far outside of Tibet. 
The West Saharans witnessed similar challenges in gaining international support using the 
backfire effect. Allies of Morocco, to include the United States, have stilted efforts for 
international attention, although the Saharawi are garnering support from the African 
Union. Currently, leaders in both West Sahara and Tibet have mentioned a possible return 
to violent resistance if they are unable to achieve results with their current civil resistance 
movement. 
3. Stay Violent or Transition to Nonviolent Methodology? 
The three case studies demonstrate situations where a population has transitioned 
to a nonviolent resistance with mixed success. Various scholars have suggested that a 
transition to civil resistance is the preferable strategy by exploiting the pluralistic power 
structures of a state, which the government must rely on. But for the existing power 
structure to be overthrown, the population must be able to unite under similar grievances, 
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which appears to be easier to achieve when the ethnic power structure is similar. In 
addition, the decision to transition from violent resistance to civil resistance appears to 
occur most often when the insurgent capability is marginalized or removed. It is also 
important to remember, as witnessed in the case studies, that while civil resistance 
represents a potentially powerful approach, the transition to civil resistance does not 
necessarily lead to success. 
4. Final Thoughts 
Civil resistance is a viable demonstrated strategy for challenging both violent and 
nonviolent state oppression. The ability of a resistance movement to choose a specific 
strategy appears to be limited by factors that encourage a specific decision. This thesis 
found that resistance capability hinges on the power of the ethnic group. Having a limited 
number and percentage of disempowered ethnic power groups tends to promote the 
decision for civil resistance over violent insurgent strategies. Mass mobilization needed for 
a civil resistance appears predicated on the population’s ability to unify under shared 
grievances and structures, which is more likely when the disempowered populations of a 
state are less fragmented. A large number of disempowered groups favor violence as a 
strategic option, this relationship is opposite for senior partner sharing groups. Resistance 
movements should therefore be wary of any state attempt to change the ethnic makeup in 
a resistance area that does not elevate them to senior partner status. Changes in the societal 
ethnic makeup can eliminate resources from the resistance, hinder mass mobilization, and 
change the strategy to a potentially suboptimal choice. Additionally, states that want to 
decrease violence from disempowered ethnic populations should bring these people into 
the government in a substantial and legitimate manner. By elevating these groups to ethnic 
senior partner sharing positions, the government can minimize the chance for violent 
resistance. Finally, violent resistance movements must accept that when their strategy has 
been rendered ineffective, they should attempt a rapid transition to civil resistance. A 
delayed acceptance of this transition by the resistance can hinder their ability to marginalize 
counterproductive violent sub-groups from the greater mass population effort. In short, 
while civil resistance might be the statistically superior strategy in certain situations, it 
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appears to be partially constrained by existing environmental conditions and interactions 
between ethnic power groups. 
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